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The United States economy is in a phase of fiscal stress; however, if the rate of spending 
continues as it has during the last three presidential terms; the United States will soon 
experience a state of fiscal crisis. The United States must take measures to affect the rate 
of spending. Since the 1940s, DoD has made trade-offs on the goals and priorities of 
stakeholders within the system—also known as acquisition reform. This research makes 
an assessment on how DoD has implemented the last acquisition reform, the Better 
Buying Power initiatives. Interviews were conducted at the SBIRS program office and the 
Defense Acquisition University. The interviews focused on the execution of the BBPi 
within the SBIRS program and the training provided to the acquisition workforce on the 
BBPi by the DAU.   The research found that training had been provided to the acquisition 
workforce, but those at the tactical level are not taking advantage of the initiatives 
because many view them as a “marching order” versus a suggestive starting point to 
create successful and innovative acquisition outcomes. The BBPi are an excellent first 
start to address past missteps; however, more guidance to the field is required for 
successful implementation. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH ..................................................................3 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................3 
D. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH.................................................................5 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH .........................................................5 
F. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD ..........................................................5 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH REPORT ..................................7 
H. SUMMARY ......................................................................................................7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................9 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B. ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES .................................................10 
1. Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Management ....................10 
2. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1990 ....................11 
3. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 ..................12 
4. Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) .........................13 
5. Coopers & Lybrand/Technical Applied Science Corporation 
(TASC) Study .....................................................................................15 
6. Air Force Lightning Bolt Initiatives .................................................18 
7. Single Process Initiative (SPI) ...........................................................19 
8. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) ........................................20 
9. Defense Acquisition Program Assessment (DAPA) ........................22 
10. Revision of DoD Instruction 5000.02 ................................................26 
11. Government Accountability Office High Risk Series .....................30 
12. Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 .....30 
13. Better Buying Power Initiatives (BBPi) ...........................................32 
14. BBPi 2.0 ...............................................................................................34 
C. ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION .....................36 
D. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
POLICY ..........................................................................................................38 
E. ACQUISITION REFORM AND KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEORY ......39 
F. SBIRS CASE STUDY ....................................................................................42 
1. Program Office ...................................................................................42 
2. Space Group .......................................................................................42 
3. Origins of the Program ......................................................................43 
4. Cost Considerations ...........................................................................43 
5. Schedule Considerations ...................................................................44 
a. GEO 1 Space Vehicle ..............................................................44 
b. GEO 2 SV ................................................................................44 
c. GEO 3 & 4 ...............................................................................45 
d. GEO 5 & 6 ...............................................................................45 
6. SBIRS Capabilities.............................................................................45 
 viii 
7. Key Performance Parameters ...........................................................46 
8. SBIRS Source Selection .....................................................................46 
9. Lessons Learned & Best Practices....................................................48 
G. DAU CASE STUDY .......................................................................................49 
1. Origins of DAU ...................................................................................49 
2. Establishing DAU ...............................................................................50 
3. Establishing an Educational Framework ........................................50 
H. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................52 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................55 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................55 
B. INITIAL RESEARCH...................................................................................55 
C. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY .............55 
D. SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS .............................................................56 
E. INSTRUMENTATION .................................................................................56 
F. ORGANIZATIONS RESEARCHED ..........................................................57 
G. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................58 
IV. FINDINGS & ANALYSIS ........................................................................................59 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................59 
B. RESPONDENTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION............................60 
1. SBIRS Program Office ......................................................................60 
2. DAU .....................................................................................................60 
C. RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ..........................................61 
1. SBIRS Program Office ......................................................................61 
2. DAU .....................................................................................................65 
D. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS ....................................................................70 
1. SBIRS Program Office ......................................................................70 
2. DAU .....................................................................................................71 
E. ANALYSIS USING KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEORY ............................71 
F. ANALYSIS OF THE BBPI & SNIDER & RENDON FRAMEWORK 
FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY ......................73 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................74 
1. Recommendations for Programs ......................................................74 
2. Recommendations for DAU ..............................................................75 
H. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................75 
I. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................76 
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH ...............................................................................................................77 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................77 
B. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................77 
C. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................78 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.............................79 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................81 
A. DAU BBPI COURSE UPDATES .................................................................81 
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS .........................................................................82 
 ix 
1. SBIRS Interview Questions ...............................................................82 
2. DAU Interview Questions..................................................................82 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................85 
SOURCES CONSULTED BUT NOT CITED ....................................................................93 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. DAPA Performance Assessment Process (from OSD, 2005c, p. 7) ................23 
Figure 2. Theoretical Acquisition Environment—Stable and Cohesive  (from OSD, 
2005c, p. 10) ....................................................................................................24 
Figure 3. “In Practice” Acquisition Environment—Disconnected and Unstable 
(from OSD, 2005c, p. 11) ................................................................................25 
Figure 4. Comparison of 2003 and 2008 Versions of DoDI 5000.02 (from Brown, 
2009, p. 4) ........................................................................................................27 
Figure 5. Objectives of BBPi (After OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). ........................................33 
Figure 6. Better Buying Power 2.0.  (After OUSD[AT&L], 2012) ................................35 
Figure 7. Framework for Analyzing Public Procurement Policy (from Snider & 
Rendon, 2008, p. 295) ......................................................................................39 
Figure 8. Multidimensional Knowledge Flow Visualization model (from Nissen, 
2006) ................................................................................................................41 
Figure 9. SBIRS Cost Summary (from DoD, 2011) .......................................................44 
Figure 10. Bloom’s Taxonomy and DAU Course Progression (from Layton, 2007, p. 
42) ....................................................................................................................52 
Figure 11. Qualification Framework (from McFarland, 2011, p. 13) ...............................68 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Packard Initiatives (from Gates, 1989). ...........................................................12 
Table 2. DoD Regulatory Compliance Cost Premium:  Coopers & Lybrand Top 10 
Cost Drivers (from Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 16) ...........................................16 
Table 3. 1994 Air Force Lightning Bolt Initiatives (from Kittfield, 1997) ...................19 
Table 4. DAPA Performance Improvement Recommendations (from OSD, 2005, p. 
14) ....................................................................................................................26 
Table 5. Top Five Issue Areas Contained in the DoD IG’s Audits of Acquisition 
and Acquisition Contract Management (from DoD IG, 2009, p. 28) ..............28 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACM  Acquisition Career Management   
AFIT   Air Force Institute of Technology   
AFROC  Air Force Requirements Oversight Council 
ALARM  Alert, Locate, and Report Missiles  
APB   Acquisition Program Baseline  
ASD(A) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition  
BBPi   Better Buying Power initiatives 
BMC  Battle Management Capability 
B-SIG  Business Senior Integration Group 
CAIV   Cost as an Independent Variable  
CAS  Cost Accounting Standards 
CCW  Capable Contracting Workforce  
CMI   Civil Military Integration  
COCOM  Combatant Command  
CONUS Continental United States 
COTS   Commercial-off-the-Shelf   
CPAF   Cost-Plus Award Fee  
CPFF   Cost-Plus Fixed Fee  
CREP   Contract Repair Enhancement Program   
C/SCS  Cost and Schedule Control System  
CSIS   Center for Strategic and International Studies  
C to Q  Certification to Qualification 
DAPA  Defense Acquisition Program Assessment  
DAS   Defense Acquisition System 
DAU   Defense Acquisition University  
DAPWG  Defense Acquisition Policy Working Group  
DCAA  Defense Contract Audit Agency  
DCMA  Defense Contract Management Agency    
DCMC  Defense Contracting Management Command  
DoD  Department of Defense 
 xvi 
DoDI   Department of Defense Instruction  
DSMC  Defense Systems Management College 
DSP   Defense Support Program  
EASE   Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency  
EMD   Engineering and Manufacturing Development  
ESP   Efficient Space Procurement  
FEWS  Follow-on Early Warning System 
FOC  Final Operational Capability 
FPIF  Fixed-price Incentive Fee  
FY   Fiscal Year  
FYDP   Future Years Defense Program  
GAO  General Accounting Office 
GAO   Government Accountability Office  
GEO   Geosynchronous Earth Orbit  
GPS   Global Positioning System  
HEO   Highly Elliptical Orbit  
HIC   Human-in-Control  
IG   Inspector General  
IOC   Initial Operational Capability  
ITW/AA  Integrated Tactical Warning & Attack Assessment  
JCIDS  Joint Capabilities Integration Development System  
JROC   Joint Requirements and Oversight Council  
KPP  Key Performance Parameters 
KSAs  Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities 
LCC  Life cycle Cost 
LCIC  Learning Capabilities and Integration Center 
MAJCOM  Major Command  
MDA   Milestone Decision Authority 
MDAP  Major Defense Acquisition Program   
MDD   Material Development Decision  
MILDEP Military Department 
MSI  Mission Success Incentives 
 xvii 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act 
NDI   Non-Developmental Items   
NDU   National Defense University  
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School  
NORAD  North American Aerospace Defense Command  
OFPP  Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
OJT   On-the-Job Training  
OL   Operating Location   
OSD   Office of the Secretary of Defense  
PAT   Process Action Team  
POP  Program Operating Plan 
PM AQS Program Management Acquisition Qualification Standards  
PPBE  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
RAA  Rapid Acquisition Authority  
RDT  Rapid Deployment Training   
R&D  Research & Development 
SAE  Service Acquisition Executive 
SAR  Selected Acquisition Report 
SBIRS  Space Based Infrared Systems  
SDD   System Development and Demonstration   
SFP  SBIRS Follow-on Production 
SMC   Space and Missile Systems Center 
SMC/PK Space and Missile Systems Center, Directorate of Contracting 
SOW  Statement of Work  
SPI   Single Process Initiative  
SV  Space Vehicle 
TASC   Technical Applied Sciences Corporation 
TD  Technology Development 
TINA   Truth in Negotiations Act  
TSPR   Total System Performance Responsibility  
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics  
 xviii 
USG  United States Government 
WRALC  Warner Robins Air Logistics Center  
WSARA  Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act   
 
 xix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xx 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This research would not have been successful without the assistance of many 
people. First, I would like to thank my husband Robert for putting up with my ridiculous 
hours spent away because of thesis writing and research. 
I would also like to thank my advisors Dr. Rene Rendon and Dr. Mark Nissen for 
their guidance and assistance in shaping this project. 
At Space and Missile Systems Center, I would like to thank the group I 
interviewed in the SBIRS program office: Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Merchant, Lieutenant 
Colonel David Meinke, Captain John Sharkey and Mark Choi.  
At the Defense Acquisition University, I would like to thank Barbara Smith, 
Pamela Gouldsberry, Lenny Manning, Bill Parker, Tom Vandenberg and John Higbee. 
Lastly, I would like to thank ARP for editing services, funding for the project and 
the opportunity to conduct research that interests me. 
 xxi 





The United States economy is in a phase of fiscal stress; if the rate of spending 
continues as it has during the last three presidential terms, the United States will soon 
experience a state of fiscal crisis. Because the Department of Defense (DoD) budget is 
based in large part on discretionary funding, the military departments (MILDEPS) must 
identify creative ways to maximize every dollar received. The United States is in a 
position to obtain loans to finance current operations and restructure debt, but if measures 
are not taken to affect the rate of spending, it will be too late to prevent exponential 
increases (Jones, 2012, p. 1). Service chiefs, along with Secretary of Defense and 
congressional representatives, need to focus on the realities of what can be accomplished 
without cutting into the basic capability of the Services to organize, train, and equip 
personnel. 
The quest to fix the acquisition process has been a novel idea since the late 1940s 
(Gates, 1989, p. 2). However, in each subsequent reform, the focus has been to retract the 
process that was previously acceptable and insert a new one. At the crux of all acquisition 
reform initiatives is the issue of trade-offs, or what goals and priorities are important to 
key stakeholders—the military departments, the defense industry, and Congress, just to 
name a few. The size of military budgets for operations is cyclical due to the priorities of 
the President and Congress at any given time (Cancian, 1995, p. 190). However, the goals 
and priorities of stakeholders for too long have overridden the government’s ability, or 
even the necessity to be fiscally conservative. Now, out of sheer necessity and statutory 
measures (Budget Control Act of 2011), Congress has been directed to face this problem 
and provide a workable solution or face the evils of sequestration. The DoD must 
continue to increase the operational capability of military departments, while finding 
ways to spend each dollar in the most efficient way possible. Far too often, the less-than-
stellar outcomes of poor acquisitions stem from the inability to adequately plan, resulting 
in not obtaining quality goods and services in a timely manner and at a fair price. We can 
no longer afford such outcomes. Given the current fiscal demands and the fiscal 
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challenges we face in the 21st century, the federal government must improve its ability to 
acquire goods and services in a cost-effective manner (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2005, p. i). 
The ability to effectively manage an acquisition program relies heavily on the 
capability of a defense acquisition system (DAS), the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS), the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBE) process and the quality of the acquisition workforce. All are vitally important, as 
they play a significant role in bringing a requirement from an idea to fruition. The process 
of maintaining a proficient and highly skilled acquisition workforce is critically important 
to the process running as smoothly and efficiently as possible.   
In the last several years, new acquisition reforms have been introduced through 
legislation and organic efforts by the DoD: the revision of Department of Defense 
Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, & Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2008) and the Weapons Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. The revision of DoDI 5000.02 made wholesale changes 
by consolidating legislation since the last revision of the instruction in 2003. The majority 
of the changes to DoDI 5000.02 focused on the front end of the defense acquisition 
framework, from the Material Development Decision (MDD) through Milestone C. The 
WSARA (2009) combined with DoDI 5000.02 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008) gave increased 
oversight to front-end acquisition planning. Initial planning affords awareness of cost 
performance throughout a program’s life cycle (GAO, 2012, p. 29). The linkage of 
acquisition reform that bundles many of the previous efforts together is the 
OUSD(AT&L)’s (2010a) Better Buying Power memorandum.  
Ashton Carter, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology 
and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], along with the key input of Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) President Katrina McFarland, created the Better Buying Power initiatives (BBPi) 
within his span of control. These initiatives were not so much reform based, but rather, 
based on best practices of successful programs (Gouldsberry, 2012, p. 1). The 23 
initiatives were identified by responsibility; at the program manager level, this included 
shared responsibility between the program manager and contracting officer, and that of 
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the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services (DAU, 2011). In an article 
interviewing DAU President Katrina McFarland, it was estimated that it will take two to 
four years for the BBPi to “trickle down” to the working level (Host, 2012, p. 1). The 
article goes on to explain that senior/top-level management understand the need and 
urgency of the BBPi, but that is not who is on the floor day after day carrying out the 
policy implemented from the top. This research explores this issue from the perspective 
of knowledge flow theory and the impact of not drawing the critical connections between 
theory and practice. The purpose of the BBPi is to consolidate and implement best 
practices of previous DoD acquisition reforms. With the exception of the should-cost and, 
will-cost analysis along with cash flow, the initiatives presented by the USD(AT&L) are 
not novel. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, the focus of this study is to provide 
a benchmark on the BBPi from a training perspective. I investigate the training resources 
provided by the DAU in support of the BBPi. After evaluating the data, I provide an 
assessment of the DAU’s implementation of the BBPi principles in terms of immediate 
and future training opportunities, since improved training is the goal of this research. 
Second, I assess the implementation and application of the initiatives in the Air Force’s 
Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) program. The BBPi are the latest measures taken 
to decrease spending and life-cycle costs of current and future acquisition programs. This 
research project is current and timely because it provides an assessment of what the Air 
Force and DAU have done to meet this mandate since its issuance in September 2010.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The BBPi are not intended to be a checklist for the MILDEPs to follow to achieve 
automatic cost savings but are to be a guideline of actions to take, provided they are 
feasible for that particular program and the phase the program is at in the acquisition life 
cycle. The research questions I explored are:  
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• Question #1: How has the DoD responded to implementing the BBPi—
execution within Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) from the 
perspective of the SBIRS program, focusing particularly on the November 
3, 2010, memorandum?  
• Question #2: How has the DAU responded to the training needs of the 
acquisition workforce with respect to the BBPi?  
Because there are currently 96 MDAPs between the start of development and the 
early stages of production, and because the BBPi are applied to each and every MDAP, 
the research answers this question by evaluating the SBIRS program against the BBPi. 
Although this program is currently in production and deployment, BBPi principles can be 
used to achieve the best outcome no matter where a system is in the life cycle (GAO, 
2012, p.1). The DAU provides initial training to the acquisition workforce, as well as 
refresher and rapid deployment training. Since the inception of the BBPi, both short-term 
and long-term improvements have responded to the training needs and goals of 
implementing the principles into contracting and the program management training 
curriculum for Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification. 
After analyzing the data obtained from the SBIRS and the DAU, I determine how these 
outcomes are relevant to DoD acquisition and its workforce and what should be done 
going forward. 
Because this is a qualitative study, and there is not an established snapshot of the 
progress of the implementation of the BBPi, the BBPi implementation directive of 
November 3, 2010 (OUSD[AT&L], 2010b), is used as a barometer to assess the level of 
effort taken by the SBIRS program office and the DAU to meet the reform intent. The 23 
BBPi are structured under five major thrust areas with specific actions to be completed. 
Within the November 3 memorandum, the OUSD(AT&L) gives mandatory compliance 
measures by all MDAPs, as applicable, covering all areas of responsibility as identified in 
the initiatives themselves (OUSD[AT&L], 2010b). 
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D. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The benefit of an assessment of DoD implementation of the BBPi provides 
leadership with initial data to decide on a way forward in addressing the current issues 
concerning acquisition. This study provides a benchmark of accessing the BBPi against 
the health of an MDAP. Future research can capitalize on the savings identified by the 
initiatives outlined in the BBPi. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
There are copious data on the SBIRS and the USD(AT&L)’s BBPi; however, the 
literature concerning DoD implementation of the BBPi since its inception does not exist. 
There is much theory about whether or not the initiatives are good ideas or what needs to 
be changed, but a study that looks at one MDAP with respect to the processes delineated 
by the USD(AT&L) does not exist. 
The data speak for themselves; however, it is the human element, those managing 
the program on a daily basis that adds a third dimension to the analysis. The SBIRS has 
been the source of much research and scrutiny. Subject to changing priorities, managerial 
styles, and acquisition strategies, the SBIRS program has struggled to deliver a system on 
time and on budget. Lastly, the fact that the SBIRS was the only MDAP assessed as part 
of this research is a significant limitation in and of itself. The SBIRS is an extreme case 
of the acquisition process run amok. Although many alternative explanations exist for the 
SBIRS’s various program performance issues, it is difficult to draw causal conclusions. 
In addition, because each MDAP has its own set of circumstances, it is difficult to 
generalize the findings of the case study to other MDAPs.   
F. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
A case study research methodology is used for this research project. Using the 
case study method allows researchers to answer the how and the why of their research 
question, eliminates the need to control for behavioral events, and focuses on 
contemporary events (Yin, 2009, p. 8). The first case study is the Air Force’s SBIRS 
program and the implementation of the BBPi. The second case study evaluates the 
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training provided by the DAU to the acquisition workforce on the BBPi, specifically 
training on the initiatives and how the BBPi were incorporated into the DAWIA 
certification programs, particularly program management and contracting. Evaluating the 
execution and training focus areas completes the metaphorical loop of knowledge (M. E. 
Nissen, personal communication, June 7, 2012).   
SBIRS program managers and contracting officers were interviewed using semi-
structured questions. The questions focused on how the initiatives have been specifically 
implemented in the SBIRS program. Although the SBIRS is an older program, nearing its 
16th anniversary, there is still more to be said about achieving efficiencies and cost-
effective measures in a program where millions of dollars equate to a sunk cost. Until the 
first geosynchronous earth orbit satellite (GEO-1) completes its operational testing, the 
Air Force still uses the 1970s Defense Support Program (DSP) to provide the capabilities 
that the SBIRS has had problems delivering (Richelson, 2007; Werner, 2011). The 
purpose of the BBPi is to re-think the status quo concerning the business arrangements 
used on contracts and in the areas of program management. The idea is not to dictate the 
protocol, but rather to get the acquisition workforce to think critically when setting up 
business arrangements. The attitude of “we’ve always done it this way” stifles and 
effectively eliminates methods to conduct business more efficiently. Parts of the 
initiatives provided directives to implement several methods to achieve cost savings, but 
these are to be implemented only if they make sense for the program concerned. For that 
reason, the November 3 implementation directive (OUSD[AT&L], 2010b) served as a 
framework for focusing the interview questions in this research. The measures outlined in 
the directive are broad and do not affect each acquisition program; however, where they 
were applicable to SBIRS, I formulated interview questions for discussion.   
The second half of the research focuses on the DAU. The format is the same as 
the SBIRS case study. Interviews of the center directors for Acquisition Management and 
Contracting focused on course changes with respect to the initiatives within the 
applicable DAWIA certification programs. Research also discussed the four-step course 
design process and the use of Bloom’s taxonomy in developing DAWIA course curricula 
certifications (Layton, 2007).   
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G. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  
Chapter I, Introduction, provides a perspective on the current fiscal situation, how 
that is inextricably linked to the capability of the United States military, and how the 
acquisition workforce enables the military’s mission to be completed. I explain the last 
acquisition reform initiative, the BBPi, and explore current DoD organizations SBIRS 
and the DAU, using a case study format. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a review of select acquisition reform 
initiatives, starting with the Packard Blue Ribbon Commission and ending with a short 
case study of the SBIRS program and the DAU. 
Chapter III, Methodology, explains the process used to collect information for the 
study. 
Chapter IV, Findings and Analysis, discusses the results of the interviews with 
personnel at the DAU and the Air Force’s SBIRS. An analysis is provided  using 
Nissen’s (2006) Multidimensional Knowledge Flow Visualization model and the Snider 
and Rendon (2008) framework for assessing public procurement policy.   
Chapter V, Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research, 
provides a summary of the findings, provides conclusions and discusses potential areas 
for future research.  
H. SUMMARY 
At the completion of this project, the goal is to provide an initial baseline for 
assessing the implementation progress of the DoD’s BBPi. Although this project does not 
assess each acquisition program office in each military department, it does provide rich 
discussion about how to effect change in DoD acquisition. Going forward, the ability to 
achieve value out of every dollar in realizing capabilities is palpable. As outlined in the 
priorities by USD(AT&L) Mr. Frank Kendall, the DAU, as well as the Service 
components, are committed long term to achieving this objective (OUSD(AT&L), 2011). 
At the conclusion of this research, the research provides an assessment on how the 
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DoD—through the DAU and from a service perspective—has progressed in 
implementing the BBPi. I also provide suggestions for what the next steps should 
include, giving the BBPi enough traction to become the status quo instead of the shiny 
new policy that seeks to fix the acquisition process. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As much as the need for technology advancement is critical, so is the need to 
balance that requirement with the impending reality that resources are constrained. The 
United States has not fostered a culture of investing smartly for our future; we have spent 
money we did not have (Jones, 2012, p. 1). To correct destructive behaviors, the DoD has 
had a change of heart, or perhaps several for that matter, and has sought to reform the 
defense acquisition process many times over. Acquisition reform can be likened to 
Baskin-Robbins ice cream or to Burger King; you can have a different flavor every week, 
any way you’d like it. The analogy highlights the notion that acquisition reform in any 
sense is based on trade-offs—trade-offs of cost, schedule, and performance among each 
and every stakeholder (Cancian, 1995, pp. 191–192). As a steward of taxpayer dollars, it 
is important for the DoD to get value out of every dollar spent on defense, no matter the 
current landscape.  
To understand the current situation and state of acquisition reform, the past must 
be analyzed, with a review of past reforms and initiatives. The approaches vary from 
stringent oversight, to minimal, to almost no oversight; from the most stringent military 
specifications to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products integrated into the most 
advanced weapons system; from cost being a sole driver of technology development to 
gold-plated requirements, no matter the costs. Past acquisition reforms (whether or not 
they were effective) shape the measures taken by today’s senior acquisition leaders to 
shape the business outcomes of tomorrow. 
Many initiatives, statutes, acts, and laws pass through Congress mandating a new 
way of doing business. Instead of starting from the very beginning, the start of this 
acquisition reform research begins with President Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense, the Packard Commission of 1986, and works through the various reforms 
leading to today’s BBPi. The reason for limiting the focus is that the BBPi are a 
culmination of the best practices since the Packard Commission. In this chapter, I outline 
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why some practices have been successful and why others have fizzled. Many initiatives 
are launched, but their impact on the acquisition landscape is not always effectively 
managed. DoD implements new reform before realizing the effects of the last effort. The 
literature review is a chronology of acquisition reforms starting with the Packard 
Commission. It then walks through the reform that highlights the SBIRS program as a 
pilot for new acquisition reforms, Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) and 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). 
The 1950s through 1980s was a boon for technology development in the DoD. 
With the threat of a Cold War, the United States was positioning itself for whatever 
adversary was to strike with the capability of meeting it head on. Discretionary spending 
was at an all-time high. During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan placed an increased 
emphasis on military readiness and capability.   
B. ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES 
1. Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Management 
Near the end of his term in office, President Reagan ordered the President’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Management, also known as the Packard Commission (Gates, 
1989, p. 7). The entire era is not made up of wasted taxpayer dollars scenarios; some 
programs were successful, bringing the most cutting-edge technology to the warfighter 
with affordable life-cycle costs. It is critical to step back and gain some perspective on 
the leadership at the time that was later instrumental in the Blue Ribbon Commission. In 
1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Deputy Secretary of Defense David 
Packard took office. They were keen on addressing the problems plaguing defense 
acquisition: excessive centralization, inefficiencies in the acquisition process, and a 
separation between authority of implementation and accountability for the outcome 
(Gates, 1989, p. 4). The sentiment of Laird and Packard was that previous administrations 
convoluted the process, making the process more difficult by requiring non-value-added 
data. To solve this problem, Laird and Packard acted to decentralize execution and 
tighten the acquisition process by giving program managers more autonomy. They also 
sought to improve the requirements generation process, increase operational testing, and 
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improve cost-estimating procedures (Gates, 1989, p. 4). With these goals in mind, the 
Packard initiatives were created, highlighting three focus areas: monitoring contractor 
and government work efforts, increasing program manager quality, and improving the 
quality of existing programs by focusing on the acquisition process itself. Outlined in 
memoranda to the acquisition workforce, the policy elements included the points detailed 
in Table 1.  
In 1986, President Reagan appointed David Packard as chairman of the 
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense, later known as the Packard 
Commission. The focus of the Packard Commission was to evaluate defense management 
in general and the acquisition process in particular (Gates, 1989, p. 7). Drawing on 
initiatives Packard established in the 1970s, the foundation of the recommendations to 
President Reagan for acquisition reform was based upon Packard’s earlier work. In 
addition, the Commission recommended budgeting techniques, such as multi-year 
procurement and authorizations to improve program stability. With the exception of 
altering the appropriations process, all of the recommendations provided were signed into 
law in April 1986 and incorporated into the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Gates, 1989, p. 7). 
2. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1990 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1990 established a panel of 
experts to evaluate changes to DoD acquisition regulations. As a result of its analysis, the 
panel recommended changes for eliminating approximately 50% of the 600 statues that 
affected DoD acquisition (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 13). These statutes included repeal 
and replacement of the Walsh–Healey Public Contracts Act’s (1936) labor protections, 
deleting the requirement for labor surplus area studies, and deleting previous provisions 
for small business set-asides on foreign military sales (General Accounting Office 
[GAO], 1993, p. 46). In addition, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA, 1990) was signed into law, establishing education and training standards, 
requirements, and courses for the civilian and military workforce. This was the impetus 
for the DAU (Layton, 2007, p. iii). 
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Table 1.   Packard Initiatives (from Gates, 1989). 
 
 
3. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
Using the recommendations of the 1990s NDAA Section 800 Panel, the OSD 
(1994) issued a decree for acquisition transformation titled Acquisition Reform: A 
Mandate for Change. The 21-page document runs in concert to the principles of today’s 
acquisition system—a flexible system with commercial-like processes, products, and 
technologies (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 14; Perry, 1994). The  February 1994 document 
emphasized civil military integration (CMI)—the integration of the civilian commercial 
and military industrial base—and changed the definitions of commercial and non-
developmental items (NDI) while providing special provisions exempting contract 
actions, which included these items for DoD regulations and requirements (Lorell & 
Graser, 2001, p. 11). The mandate created a position for the Deputy Under Secretary for 
Acquisition Reform and a process action team (PAT) to review military specifications to 
reduce government oversight of regulations and contractors (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 
14). Most of the recommendations in the memorandum were incorporated into the 
Packard Initiatives 
•Provide for systematic program reviews by OSD officials at important program milestones 
(resulting in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council [DSARC]). 
•Provide the OSD with independent cost estimates and improve cost-estimate quality by 
establishing a cost analysis improvement group (CAIG) within the OSD. 
•Establish cost as a program objective, equal to schedule and performance in importance, and 
consider operations and support costs during the development process (design to cost and life-
cycle costing). 
•Increase testing objectivity by establishing operational test and evaluation (OT&E) agencies 
that are independent of the Service commands responsible for the development effort. 
•Establish military training courses and schools to improve the program managers’ training. 
•Give program managers a clear written charter to strengthen their authority. 
•Provide better promotion opportunities to attract superior officers to program management. 
•Reduce the turnover rate of program managers so that they have longer job tenure. 
•Resolve technological uncertainties during development, not during production (e.g., increase 
prototyping, emphasize early and more complete hardware testing, and reduce concurrency) 
•Encourage competitive hardware developments to reduce risk and stimulate contractor efforts 
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Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. The FASA opened the floodgates, 
focusing on the use of commercial procedures and technologies.  1994 was a big year for 
acquisition reform. 
4. Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) 
As part of Bill Clinton’s campaign, he promised to minimize the size of 
government. A large portion of the reduction came from government personnel and a 
large percentage of was acquisition workforce personnel. Expertise was replaced with 
various management approaches. TSPR was one of the management approaches used in 
place of tried and tested program management expertise. During the 20th century, the 
model moved from bureaucracies to networks, focusing on innovation in an outsourced 
environment.   Instead of having the capability organically, the focus became on how to 
contract for that expertise in the most efficient (not necessarily effective) manner.   
It is said that much can be deduced from a name. A name has a denotation, a 
meaning, and a connotation, a reference that implies a general sentiment or feeling. For 
the DoD and acquisition in the mid-1990s, TSPR was a program management concept 
used to augment a smaller acquisition workforce while giving autonomy and 
responsibility to the contractor. Implemented by the Clinton administration to scale back 
the size of the acquisition workforce and as a policy to consolidate the United States’ 
defense industrial base, the concept was ill-used on a widespread basis (Muradian, 2002, 
p. 4). More than one definition of TSPR was found. Depending on who is queried and 
their specialty, the answer varies. However, Pandes (2001) defined TSPR as an 
acquisition strategy to “improve the quality of product or service, reduce costs and gain 
efficiencies” (p. 29). At the beginning, the strategy sounded great and was the answer to 
the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum requiring the use of performance specifications 
in lieu of military specifications and also to the Pentagon acquisition chief Jacques 
Gansler’s call for performance-based service acquisition (Pandes, 2001, p. 29). Proven 
management systems engineering practices were abandoned for un-validated engineering 
and acquisition practices. If TSPR was structured in a manner to achieve the goals of the 
Secretary of Defense and Gansler, it would be the panacea to costly acquisition programs; 
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however, it is not. For the many definitions of TSPR, there were just as many opinions on 
its status as an option for an acquisition strategy and its method of implementation for 
use. TSPR does not allow the government to control programs or manage the industrial 
base. Pete Aldridge, current Pentagon acquisition chief, (as cited in Muradian, 2002, p. 4) 
comments in an article in Defense Daily International that TSPR focuses on the short-
term goal of increasing contractor profit and not the long-term goal of maintaining 
national security and preserving the means to produce sophisticated tools of war. 
Gill (2002), a procurement contracting officer at the Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC), criticized Pandes’ for stating that the Services, particularly the Air Force, 
championed this acquisition strategy in the face of huge cost overruns on the C-17, F-
117, and SBIRS programs (p. 26). However, Pandes (2001) did not imply or state that as 
fact. The premise and intent of Pandes’ article was that, at that time, TSPR met the 
requirements of the Air Force to keep development underway when the SBIRS was and 
remained a top priority. To Gill’s credit, as mentioned in his 2002 article, TSPR was not 
effective in development contract situations (p. 27). The major downfall of TSPR was 
that it gave away all oversight and responsibility for program success to industry. In a 
cost-plus-contract environment, which most of these system types are, the contractor in 
the end only risks losing a fee, whereas the government is left with an unusable product. 
In spite of the downsizing of the acquisition workforce and the requirements being 
fielded by the DoD and the military departments, organic contracting capability was 
shrinking fast, and TSPR seemed to be a reasonable solution to the problem. As Gill 
(2002) highlighted, “The government is ultimately responsible for the performance of 
systems provided to the warfighter. It is a responsibility that cannot—and should not—be 
transferred” (p. 27). 
The downfall of TSPR came from inappropriate insight from government 
personnel over contractor teams. Additionally, the lack of DoD organizational capability 
to manage contracts with insight instead of oversight, and the lack of systems engineering 
and cost estimating expertise, which is essential in managing with insight caused the 
downfall of TSPR (and is still causing the downfall of other performance-based 
acquisition approaches). Inherently there is nothing wrong with TSPR; however, the 
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hands-off, cavalier approach of government program management personnel did not 
require or define the relationship to provide the necessary insight and oversight in order 
to achieve the correct business outcome. The government’s lack of organizational 
capability to manage acquisition programs using insight automatically negates any ability 
to provide proper insight and oversight within a government network (government and 
industry working together). Within a government network, the lines of accountability and 
control become blurred.   
5. Coopers & Lybrand/Technical Applied Science Corporation (TASC) 
Study 
Towards the end of 1994, the DoD championed an independent review of the 
regulatory contract cost premiums, the cost of doing business with the DoD, not 
applicable to the commercial sector. The private consulting firm, Coopers & Lybrand 
elevated the conversation of cost savings that could be achieved through reduction in 
DoD regulation and oversight. The study identified over 120 regulatory and statutory 
“cost drivers” that increased the price the DoD pays for goods and services by 18% 
(GAO, 1996, p. 1). Part of the study highlighted the top three cost drivers accounting for 
more than 20% of the DoD’s cost premiums: MIL-Q-9858A (military specification for 
quality control), the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA, 1962), and the Cost and Schedule 
Control System (C/SCS) (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 16). Table 2 identifies 48.9% of cost 
premiums on top of the cost to perform the service or produce the capability necessary. 
Adopting performance standards instead of the technical specification, as recommended 
by Coopers & Lybrand, reduces costs in the long run, but, if not written properly, lends to 
ambiguity in requirements. TINA and the C/SCS (currently known as earned value 
management), although cost drivers, ensure that the government is getting timely cost and 





Table 2.   DoD Regulatory Compliance Cost Premium:  Coopers & Lybrand Top 10 
Cost Drivers (from Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 16) 
              
 
In response to the Coopers & Lybrand/TASC study (1994), Congress directed the 
DoD to assess these “cost drivers.” The GAO responded with a report outlining the effort 
to reduce the cost to manage and oversee DoD contracts (GAO, 1996). The report 
focused on the “cost drivers” in Table 2. In response, the DoD coordinated a regulatory 
cost premium working group to coordinate DoD-wide efforts to address the cost-driver 
areas (GAO, 1996, p. 2). Using a cross-functional team approach with members from 
DoD functions, the MILDEPS, and government agencies to develop solutions minimizing 
the impact of the cost drivers, the teams were able to identify areas for change and to 
recommend options other than the current operating procedures, as well as 
implementation plans for the ideas generated.     
            Based on the recommendations of the cross-functional teams, in June 1994 the 
Secretary of Defense directed the use of performance-based specifications and standards 
to the maximum possible extent and the development of a streamlined procurement 
process to modify existing contracts, encouraging contractors to propose commercial 
practices (GAO, 1996, p. 4). In September 1994, the DoD established a laboratory for 
reducing oversight costs. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense 
Contracting Management Command (DCMC) (which is now Defense Contract 
Management Agency, [DCMA]) and industry contractors as well as DoD buying 
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activities came together to identify oversight cost drivers, assess if the oversight was 
appropriate, and identify and implement process improvements to reduce oversight costs 
(GAO, 1996, p. 4). In February 1995, MIL-Q-9858A, a military specification for quality 
requirements was deactivated. What the GAO (1996) does not discuss is that these cost 
premiums are regulatory requirements. The report is also silent on what the process is if a 
requirement’s risk is low and on how oversight costs can be reduced. 
                Preliminary results concerning cost savings at the end of 1995 were dismal at 
best. Of the 10 contractors involved in the laboratory efforts, only three had actions to 
alleviate DoD requirements with a 1% savings, totaling $119 million (GAO, 1996, p. 4). 
There is a large discrepancy between Coopers & Lybrand/TASC’s 18% cost premium 
and the projected 1% by the DoD’s laboratory. One explanation is that Coopers & 
Lybrand did not assess the benefits afforded to the government because of these 
regulatory requirements. They only assessed the costs. Many of these costs are applied to 
these contract requirements because they protect the interests of the government and 
make good business sense. Also, in the absence of these regulatory cost premiums many 
contractors would have self-imposed restrictions to ensure contract performance that 
could drive costs even higher. Non-performance of a system is mission failure; it is not 
just about saving dollars. The adage “you get what you pay for” is relevant, but neither 
the GAO report nor the groups interviewed in the Coopers & Lybrand/TASC study 
acknowledged this conclusion. As key stakeholders in the success of removing regulatory 
cost drivers and replacing them with industry practices, contractors must be vested in the 
effort. By March 1996, four of the 10 contractors involved initially were not actively 
pursuing the development of additional cost-savings ideas (GAO, 1996, p. 6).   
              The DoD maintained that the GAO’s conclusion that the savings achieved from 
the laboratory might be less than estimated was “pure speculation” and work which made 
up the accounted for cost savings was in progress at the end of December 1995. In 1997, 
the GAO completed an additional assessment on the laboratory’s progress and concluded 
that:  
the reinvention laboratory has made only limited progress in implementing 
changes to reduce contractors’ costs of complying with government regulations 
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and oversight requirements. In particular, laboratory participants reported little 
success in addressing 9 of the top 10 cost drivers. (GAO, 1997, p. 4)   
 
The report goes on to address the lack of success the laboratory had in finding and 
realizing the projected cost savings. The DoD had a lack of support from top-level 
management (GAO, 1997, p. 4). DoD and contractor personnel disagreed on the value of 
oversight (p. 4). The laboratory had difficulty in coordinating proposed changes when 
multiple customers were involved (p. 5). GAO expressed that DoD should use caution 
when using estimated cost reduction figures from oversight reform to create additional 
regulations (p. 5). Only a small portion of the projected savings had been realized in July 
1996 when the laboratory was closed. Many of the cost savings identified were changes 
in contractors’ quality assurance programs (p. 8).   
6. Air Force Lightning Bolt Initiatives 
Although most reforms are initiated at the DoD-wide level, during the mid to late 
1990s the Air Force was at the forefront of streamlining the acquisition process. From the 
beginning, Darleen Druyun as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Acquisition 
and Management made her mark on the acquisition reform process. After a discussion 
with her OSD counterpart concerning a Global Positioning System (GPS) proposal, 
Druyun reviewed the 1,200-page document and devised an 11-point implementation 
directive (outlined in Table 3), to guide the acquisition and contracting process, also 
known as the “Lightning Bolts,” (Kittfield, 1997). Three years later, by all accounts the 
Lightning Bolt initiatives were successful and catapulted Druyun into fame, not only in 
Air Force acquisition, but also as a senior acquisition professional in the DoD. 
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Table 3.   1994 Air Force Lightning Bolt Initiatives (from Kittfield, 1997) 
 
 
7. Single Process Initiative (SPI) 
In December 1995, Secretary Perry made Single Process (SPI), originally a DoD 
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) initiative, official DoD 
policy (Pope, 1997, p. 2). The SPI’s intent was to reduce or eliminate the cost premiums 
identified in the Coopers & Lybrand study by eliminating duplicate, government-unique 
processes and replacing them with performance-based, commercial standards (Lorell & 
Graser, 2001, p. 20). The SPI sought to minimize military specifications and standards, to 
allow block contract changes to implement common processes, and to replace or 
eliminate military standards and specifications and business requirements when no value 
was added. The SPI promoted contractor flexibility to use the most efficient business and 
manufacturing processes (Pope, 1997). The woes of acquisition today were the same in 
1997. The DoD’s acquisition future was dim and the SPI was hailed as the savior. 
Defense Contract Management Command (DMDC) was the agency leading the SPI 
effort. In a PowerPoint briefing, the expectation for the SPI and for fixing acquisition was 
specified: “Acquisition Reform ... key to DoD’s future—Block Changes ... key to 
Lightning Bolt Initiatives 
•Establish a centralized request for proposal support team to scrub all RFPs, contract options, and 
contract modifications worth more than $10 million. 
•Create a standing Acquisition Strategy Panel composed of senior-level acquisition personnel from 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Air Force Materiel Command, and 
the user. 
•Develop a new System Program Office manpower model that uses tenets established in the 
management of classified and special-access programs. 
•Cancel all Air Force Materiel Command center–level acquisition policies by December 1, 1995. 
•Reinvent the Air Force System Acquisition Review Council process through Integrated Process 
Teams. 
•Enhance the role of past performance in source selections. 
•Replace acquisition documents with the Single Acquisition Management Plan 
•Revise the Program Executive Officer’s and Designated Acquisition Commander’s Portfolio Review 
to add a section that deals specifically with acquisition reform 
•Enhance the acquisition workforce with a comprehensive education and training program that 
integrates acquisition reform nitiatives. 
•Reduce by 50% the amount of time taken to award contracts that meet customers’ needs. 
•Enhance the capabilities of laboratories by adopting improved business processes learned from 
weapon system reform efforts 
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Acquisition Reform—Management Councils ... key to Block Changes” (Pope, 1997, p. 
13). The SPI was the fix to cost overruns on large procurements.  
Bergan (1997) cites several reasons that account for the lack of longevity 
concerning SPI. While SPI promoted contractor-original solutions to military 
specifications and regulations, the government evaluated proposals primarily on the basis 
of technical acceptability alone; cost considerations were not a significant factor (p. 120). 
While contractor ideas were implemented into requirements, considerations of cost were 
not explored and later in the life cycle, these solutions became cost prohibitive. Within 
Bergan’s survey, he found that contractors felt cost considerations should play less of a 
role in the technical acceptability of a proposal, while government personnel thought cost 
should play more of a role (p. 121).   
8. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
In December 1996, Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) became official DoD 
policy, applying to all new major acquisition programs (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 34). 
Lorell and Graser (2001) claimed that the major premise behind CAIV is that it makes 
cost a priority over system performance and development schedule (p. 34). However, the 
intent of CAIV is that the stakeholders are able to get the most effective and efficient 
system within the budget allotted. As an example, for any manufacturer, if its customer 
wants its widgets cheap, it encourages the use of less expensive and potentially lower 
quality commercial parts and technology. CAIV raises the importance of strict cost-
benefit analysis from the inception of a requirement all the way through development and 
production of new programs as an extremely important tool. The adage “you get what 
you pay for” looms over the concept of CAIV; however, the trade-off is when that of 
capability or performance becomes costly. By using CAIV, a conscious effort has to be 
made to prevent requirements creep, to ensure cost pricing targets are met, and to enable 
trade-off analysis between cost and performance (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 53). Although 
the intent of CAIV is to prevent the aforementioned issues, solely implementing CAIV as 
a program management mechanism by name does not make a successful program. The 
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end product is only as acceptable as the requirements selected to be part of the system are 
mature and precise.   
Lorell and Graser (2001) also focused on U.S. Air Force Space Acquisition 
Reform lead programs. The SBIRS, also a focus of this research, was included in their 
review of acquisition reform. The SBIRS is intended to replace aging DSP satellites as a 
surveillance system for ballistic missile warning, defense, and intelligence (GAO, 2012). 
The SBIRS came to fruition in 1995 after the Follow-on Early Warning System (FEWS) 
was cancelled due to cost overruns and technical issues (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 84). 
As the replacement for DSP, with a short period for development along with funding 
limitations, the SBIRS had to be developed quickly. Because of these circumstances, the 
OSD and the Air Force designated it an acquisition reform leader program. To get started, 
contractors were provided with the operational requirements in a statement of objectives, 
requiring only two military standards (Lorell & Graser, 2001, p. 84). Using CAIV, as 
total funding requirements were not available, the program provided a must-cost total 
program objective. Contractors moved forward in the source selection by keeping 
research and development (R&D), procurement, and life-cycle costs low, competing 
amongst one another.  
Two teams were awarded 15-month development contracts with the use of 
commercial practices and COTS products as a focus to reduce costs. Both were also 
afforded total control of the design and configuration. By 1996, the source selection had 
come to an end and Lockheed Martin was declared the winner. They were  awarded a 10-
year, $1.8 billion engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract. Only two 
years after the EMD contract was awarded, total program costs were estimated at $7.6 
billion (DoD DOT&E, n.d). The Air Force encouraged Lockheed to continue its 
cost/performance trade studies and work to further reduce costs by providing substantial 
award fees as explained in the following paragraph:  
As an incentive, the government approved an unusually large 20 percent 
award fee in the contract, half of which depended on successful cost 
management. To receive the highest rating for this area, the contractor had 
to further reduce the procurement price without sacrificing critical 
performance capabilities. Lockheed established a goal of a 10 percent 
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reduction in the cost of the first three satellites compared to its Best and 
Final Offer proposal during the competition. As an incentive to maintain 
performance capabilities, reliability, low LCC, and schedule, Lockheed 
 
Martin committed to paying up to 8 percent of the contract value if it 
failed to meet critical mission and program milestones. (Lorell & Graser, 
2001, p. 85) 
9. Defense Acquisition Program Assessment (DAPA) 
In June 2005, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Acting 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England expressed his thoughts about the current 
state of acquisition: “the entire acquisition structure within the [D]epartment of Defense 
needs to be reexamined and in great detail….[T]here is growing and deep concern about 
the acquisition process within the Department of Defense and in the Committee” (OSD, 
2005c, p. 3). Because of that concern, England authorized an integrated assessment 
including every aspect of acquisition from requirements to the legality of business 
arrangements (OSD, 2005b, p. 1). England ensured a simple recommendation for 
restructuring acquisition with identified responsibility and alignment of responsibility, 
authority, and accountability (OSD, 2005c, p.  4).   
The Defense Acquisition Program Assessment (DAPA) panel, the group of 
experts leading the research effort, was a mix of industry and government. The panel 
chairman at the time was the partner and vice president of the Aerospace Market Group 
for Booz Allen Hamilton. The very mixed and varied panel came from the National 
Defense University (NDU), Lockheed Martin Corporation, the Air Force, the Army, and 
several consulting firms (OSD, 2005c, p. 5). Pulling from many different points of view, 
many retired officers, knowing the challenges of the military and private sector, set out 
on a massive project to assess every aspect of DoD acquisition and its management 
systems. 
Up until 2012, many acquisition reforms were introduced and implemented, yet 
the results hoped for were not achieved. Since the Packard Commission, 128 studies of 
acquisition had been commissioned, yet none of the previous studies were able to explain 
and fix cost and schedule instability in DoD management and acquisition systems. 
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Recognizing that the system is not without flaws, the DAS operates as it should with the 
focus to deliver systems with the best performance to maintain strategic advantage and 
military power (OSD, 2005c, p. 6). As part of the DAPA panel’s assessment, they 
sourced information from a variety of areas. Figure 1 identifies the bottom-up approach 
used by the panel to prepare the assessment. This multi-faceted approach integrates all of 











Figure 1. DAPA Performance Assessment Process (from OSD, 2005c, p. 7) 
The panel was successful in whittling more than 1,000 observations into 42 areas 
of interest. From there, 13 key issues were identified that drove cost and schedule 
variances. The key areas identified were Program Structure, Acquisition Strategy, 
Complex Acquisition System, Requirement Process, Joint Requirement Development, 
Need for Leadership, Process Discipline, Oversight, Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA) 
Allocation, Program Manager Expertise, Acquisition Career Path, Industry Motivation 
and Behavior, and the PPBE process (OSD, 2005c, p.  3). Using these issues, an 
integrated performance assessment was completed, which defined eight performance 
improvements. 
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The panel also found that for 13 key issues that recurred across acquisition, the 
increased amount of oversight was crippling the defense acquisition program. The 
oversight pendulum swings from ruling with an iron fist to no oversight at all, which is 
the cycle of acquisition reform. The panel concluded that oversight must be moderated 
and shift to an accountability management model focused on process instead of a trust-
based oversight model focused on overall program actions (OSD, 2005c, p. 9). To 
improve performance, the panel recommended an integrated approach among the 
workforce, the user organization, and the industry in conjunction with the variables of 
budget requirements and acquisition (OSD, 2005c, p. 10). All of these variables have 
competing values and interests that cause instability, both cost and schedule, in defense 
acquisition programs. Figure 2 illustrates the acquisition system operating in a vacuum. 
Theoretically, an effective acquisition system is stable and cohesive. The acquisition 
workforce, the requiring organization and industry must work together to ensure 
integration of stable contract requirements and adequate budgetary resources within the 
acquisition life cycle.   
 
Figure 2. Theoretical Acquisition Environment—Stable and Cohesive  (from OSD, 
2005c, p. 10) 
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Experience has shown that in practice, competing values and objectives create a 
disconnected and unstable environment for the operation of acquisition programs. Figure 
3, shows a government induced instability within the acquisition environment.   
 
 
Figure 3. “In Practice” Acquisition Environment—Disconnected and Unstable 
(from OSD, 2005c, p. 11) 
Why and what to buy (requirements), how much and when to buy (budget) and the 
manner in which it is executed (the acquisition process) all have many stakeholders with 
unique yet competing goals. DAPA’s task as charged by OSD was to outline an 
acquisition structure with clear alignment of responsibility, authority and accountability 
(OSD, 2005c, p. 4). Table 4 summarizes the recommendations provided by the panel to 
minimize the conflict between the major elements of the acquisition system while 







Table 4.   DAPA Performance Improvement Recommendations 
(from OSD, 2005, p. 14) 
        Elements of Acquisition 
System 
    Performance Improvement                                 
Measure(s) 
The User Organization Realign authority, accountability, and 
responsibility at the appropriate level and 
streamline the acquisition oversight process 
Acquisition Workforce Rebuild and value the acquisition 
workforce and incentivize leadership 
Budget Transform the budgeting process and 
establish a distinct acquisition stabilization 
account to add oversight throughout the 
process 
Requirement—Process Replace JCIDS with combatant command 
(COCOM)-led requirements procedures in 
Services, and DoD agencies must compete 
to provide solutions 
Requirement—Management & 
Operational Testing 
Add an “operationally acceptable” test 
evaluation category. Give program 
managers explicit authority to deter 
requirements 
Acquisition—Strategy Shift to time-certain development 
procedures; adopt a risk-based source 
selection process 
Industry Overcome the consequences of reduced 
demand by sharing long-range plans and 
restructuring competitions for new 
programs with the goal of motivating 
industry investments in future technology 
on current programs 
 
10. Revision of DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the broad and wide-reaching authority 
for acquisition policy formation. Article I states the powers of Congress include the 
following: “To raise and support armies. … To provide and maintain a navy. … To make 
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. … [and] To exercise 
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever … for the erection of forts, magazines, 
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings” (U.S. Const. art I, § 8). The revision of 
DoDI 5000.02 is not directly acquisition reform, but was triggered by an active Congress 
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from 2004–2008 as a response to troubled programs and negative trends that were 
becoming prominent throughout programs in the life cycle.   The document consolidated 
all of the new policies originating at OSD, six NDAAs, legislation, statutes, and laws 
drafted and approved during fiscal years (FY) 2004–2009.   
From the initial 1971 acquisition framework of three decision points, three 
phases, and one milestone document, to December 2008’s framework of six decision 
points, five phases, and over 30 milestone documents, the amount of oversight by 
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) grew from minimal 
oversight to significantly more oversight (SM&A Associates, 2009, p. 4). Although 
previous attempts tried to build in flexibility and autonomy, many more layers of 
oversight were added to combat the original problem. The revision of DoD 5000.02 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2008) marked major changes that affected all large-dollar DoD 
contracts. Figure 4 illustrates that the focus of the changes is on the front end of 
development, Milestones A through C, and that this focus mandated a threshold prior to 
proceeding to Technology Development (TD), the material development decision (MDD) 
review.  
 
Figure 4. Comparison of 2003 and 2008 Versions of DoDI 5000.02 (from Brown, 
2009, p. 4) 
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Before 2008, legislation was being written, distributed and consolidated on an ad 
hoc basis. Policy was approved and implemented in policy memos and responses to the 
GAO, Inspector General (IG), and Congress. Meanwhile, over 700 defense acquisition 
policy working group (DAPWG) comments were socialized with industry and other 
agencies (Brown, 2009, p. 3). The DoD was building the plane while flying it. In 2009, 
the DoD IG released a summary report of the general audits of acquisition and contract 
management between 2003 and 2008 (DoD IG, 2009). Within that time period, the DoD 
IG released 142 reports. Of the 12 deficiency areas discussed within the 142 reports, the 
top five are identified in Table 5, which identifies the most recurring deficiency areas. 
The top five deficiency areas were identified by tallying the total number of audits that 
included that deficiency area for the fiscal years assessed in the report (totals in 
parentheses in Table 5). 
Table 5.   Top Five Issue Areas Contained in the DoD IG’s Audits of Acquisition and 
Acquisition Contract Management (from DoD IG, 2009, p. 28) 
Deficiency Areas Deficiency Area Criteria/Definitions 
Completeness of Support (65) Contents of contract files:  
• purchase request, acquisition planning 
information, and other pre-solicitation 
documents; 
• cost or pricing data and Certificates of 
Current Cost or Pricing Data or a 
required justification for waiver, or 
information other than cost or pricing 
data; 
• contract completion documents; 
• additional documents on what action 
was taken or that reflect actions by the 
contracting office pertinent to the 
contract. 
Material Internal Control Weakness (58) DoDI 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control 
(MIC) Program Procedures,” dated 
January 4, 2006, defines internal controls as 
the organization, policies, and procedures 
that helps program and financial managers 
to achieve results and safeguard the 
integrity of their programs. The Instruction 
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also defines a material weakness in internal 
controls as a reportable condition that is 
significant enough to report to the next 
higher level. 
Oversight and Surveillance (55) Oversight ensures that contractors are 
providing timely and quality services and 
helps mitigate any contractor performance 
problems. Surveillance is ongoing action 
throughout the performance period of the 
contract to ensure the government receives 
the goods and services it contracted for in a 
timely manner, including creating an 
official record documenting that the 
contractor’s performance was acceptable or 
unacceptable. 
Adequacy of Contract Pricing (52) The DoD is generally required to obtain 
“fair and reasonable” prices for the goods 
and services it procures from responsible 
sources. The FAR provides procedures for 
making price determinations. Based on 
FAR 15.402, “Pricing Policy,” the 
contracting officer must not obtain more 
information than necessary in establishing 
the reasonableness of the offered price. If 
the price is based on adequate price 
competition, then no additional information 
should be obtained unless adequate 
information cannot be obtained from the 
source. The contracting officer may request 
cost and pricing data to determine the fair 
and reasonable price. Information other 
than cost and pricing includes information 
related to prices such as established catalog 
or market prices or previous contract prices, 
information available within the 
government, information from other than 
the sources, and cost information that does 
not meet the cost and pricing data 
definition. 
Sufficiency of Requirements (50) DoDI 5000.2 requires each increment in an 
evolutionary acquisition program to include 
a system development and demonstration 
decision followed by a production and 
deployment decision. The Instruction 
identifies the mandatory, statutory, and 
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regulatory documents that the program 
manager is required to submit in support of 
the system development and demonstration 
decision review. Some of the required 
documents for submission include an 
independent cost estimate, a manpower 
estimate, a technology development 
strategy, and an acquisition program 
baseline. Some of the required regulatory 
documents include an initial capabilities 
document, a capability development 
document, an acquisition strategy, an 
analysis of alternatives, an affordability 
assessment, a cost analysis requirements 
description, and a test and evaluation 
master plan. 
 
Nine hundred seventy-three recommendations were made as a result of the 142 
DoD inspector general (IG) reports generated. As of September 2008, approximately 
83% of the recommendations had been closed. The deficiencies noted from the DoD IG 
reports reflect contracting process deficiencies.      
11. Government Accountability Office High Risk Series 
Annually, the GAO publishes a list of a functions within the government 
determined to be high risk being vulnerable to higher incidents of fraud, waste, abuse, 
and mismanagement. Programs also become part of this series because of the increased 
need for efficiency or effectiveness of the function. Since 2011, the DoD has expected to 
invest almost $343 billion (in FY 2011 dollars) on the development and procurement of 
major defense acquisition programs (GAO, 2011, p. 12). DoD contracting and weapons 
system acquisition have been on the high-risk series report since 1990 and 1992, 
respectively (GAO, 2011, p. 173). The notion that reform is necessary is no secret; 
however, each program is different, and so are the circumstances and responsibilities. 
12. Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 
The WSARA (2009) gave clear guidance from Congress about the hot button 
issues dealt with as of 2012: organizational/personnel and acquisition policy and process 
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changes, and Congressional reporting requirements. The act created four director 
positions appointed by the Secretary of Defense for cost assessment, test and evaluation, 
root cause analysis, and systems engineering (Lush, 2009). Concerning policies and 
processes, the Joint Requirements and Oversight Council (JROC) must obtain input from 
combatant commanders for joint requirements and set an initial operational capability 
(IOC) schedule objective for every requirement. Competition is the name of the game 
through options for competition throughout the life cycle at the prime and subcontract 
level, through prime make-or-buy decisions, and through competitive prototyping as 
required through Milestone B (Lush, 2009). At the signing ceremony, President Obama 
stated the goals of WSARA were to “limit cost overruns, strengthen oversight and 
accountability, enhance competition and end conflicts of interest” (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2009). It is too soon to tell whether implementation was successful; however, 
commentary on Erwin (2010) illustrates the concerns government and industry has with 
the WSARA:  
If you take a hard look at what’s wrong with acquisition, a big part of it is 
the suffocating level of oversight heaped on programs. GAO, IG, OSD, 
Service oversight, etc. A PM spends 95% of his or her time on compliance 
with non-value added oversight vice executing the program. Heaping yet 
more oversight is not going to solve the problem, but just make it worse. 
Don’t get me wrong, you need oversight. You just need to rationalize and 
streamline the oversight. Right now the solution for poor execution is 
more oversight. These programs are mired in overlapping, conflicting and 
contradictory oversight. Moreover, the folks conducting the oversight 
frequently know very little about the programs or technology they are 
overseeing. And empowering the very organization [sic] that is suffocating 
the programs the most is not the answer. So yes, since the Packard 
Commission there have been studies after studies, and they have all 
resulted in more oversight. It’s time to strip out the layers of oversight and 
to hold the remaining oversight accountable for mindlessly holding up 
programs for no good reason. It’s no wonder DoD can’t innovate with this 
model. A thousand people can say “no,” and barely anyone can say ‘yes.’ 
(Erwin, 2010). 
 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) completed a progress 
report on the implementation of WSARA. In their report, Berteau, Hofbauer, and Sanok 
(2010) agreed that it was too early to tell the true effects of the legislation on the 
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acquisition system, since some of the requirements of the act had not been fully 
implemented. However, the spirit and intent of WSARA is in the right place, but it does 
not address the current state as to why today’s acquisition system is the way it is—the 
nonexistence of competition (Berteau et al., 2010, p. 7). Spending on single-source 
contracts increased from 76–87% from 2004 to 2008 (Berteau et al., 2010, p. 7). One of 
the goals of WSARA is to minimize the use of single-source contracts, but the supply of 
competition is simply not available. For FY 2012, the top five contractors, Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, the Boeing Company, General Dynamics, Raytheon Company, and 
United Technologies, account for 20% of DoD contract award dollars 
(USASpending.gov, 2012). 
13. Better Buying Power Initiatives (BBPi) 
In May 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced his efficiency initiative, 
which was aimed at reducing overhead, finding efficiencies within the force structure, 
and modernizing accounts. This would in effect enable the DoD to use resources more 
effectively to support and sustain the warfighter. In response, the USD(AT&L) 
introduced the BBPi in September 2010. This guidance to the acquisition workforce, 
focusing on doing more without more, is changing how the DoD acquires systems, goods, 
and services (DAU, 2011).   
The BBPi have five thrust areas identifying the responsibilities of program 
managers, the Services, and the OSD. The five thrust areas are: 1) target affordability and 
control cost growth; 2) incentivize productivity and innovation in industry; 3) reduce 
non-productive processes and bureaucracy; 4) promote real competition and 5) improve 
tradecraft in the acquisition of services (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). The USD(AT&L) 
charged the acquisition workforce with some lofty goals. Mr. Kendall acknowledged that 
the business arrangement of former contracts could not be undone and that new 
efficiencies would be primarily focused on new contracts (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). Figure 
5, Objectives of the BBPi, underscores the long-term efforts that the BBPi seek to 
achieve (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a).  
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Figure 5. Objectives of BBPi (After OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). 
The bottom-line reality is that the DoD must continue to grow its warfighting 
capabilities by 2–3% annually amidst diminishing budgets and smaller production runs 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2010a).   
As part of the strategy for implementing the BBPi, to increase efficiency and 
productivity in acquisition, space programs have asked Congress for block buy 
authorization. The Air Force has adopted a streamlined strategy for implementing BBPi 
for space acquisition. Originally known as Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency 
(EASE), and, as of 2012, called Efficient Space Procurement (ESP), this strategy operates 
on the following four tenets:   
• Tenet 1: Purchase satellites in block buys creating efficient production 
lines, buy economically sound quantities of parts, and reduce non-
recurring engineering costs.   
• Tenet 2: Use fixed-price contracting once satellites are no longer in 
development (where most of the cost/risk resides).   
• Tenet 3: Establish stable research and development investments to 
improve the performance and lower the cost of follow-on systems.   
BBPi Objectives  
• Deliver the warfighting capability we need for the dollars we have  
• Get better buying power for the warfighter and taxpayer 
• Restore affordability to defense goods and services 
• Improve defense industry productivity 
• Remove government impediments to leanness 
• Avoid program turbulence 
• Maintain a vibrant and financially healthy defense industry 
Obtain 2-3% net annual growth in warfighting capabilities without commensurate 
budget increase by identifying and eliminating unproductive or low -value-added 
overhead and transfer savings to warfighting capabilities.  Do more without more. 
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• Tenet 4:  Enlist a modified funding profile through advanced 
appropriations over multiple years to spread acquisition cost over multiple 
years while still meeting full funding requirements (Skotte, 2012). 
 
The BBPi do not recreate the wheel of acquisition and contract management 
techniques. The initiatives place increased emphasis on the current economic and 
acquisition environment in areas where the DoD has been unsuccessful in meeting 
desired outcomes. Part of the impetus behind the BBPi is the relative success, or lack 
thereof, of the previous initiatives.  The BBPi are an attempt to refocus program 
management professionals on some of the target areas for savings and efficiency that may 
not have been implemented in a complete fashion. DoD Instruction 5000.02 of December 
2008 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008) and the WSARA of 2009 were previous attempts to 
introduce rigor and efficiency into the acquisition process.  There is a good deal of 
synergy between the previous acquisition reforms and the BBPi (DAU, 2011). The idea 
at the crux of the BBPi is three-fold: (1) It is a reform measure, streamlining those that 
have come before; (2) it is formulated as a mandate to follow pre-established policy; and 
(3) it incorporates all of the best practices of reforms enacted in the past. 
14. BBPi 2.0 
On April 24, 2012, Katrina McFarland, president of the DAU and assistant 
secretary of defense for acquisition ASD(A) briefed the progress of BBPi to date and the 
way ahead. In additional to the 23 original BBPi, she introduced nine new potential BBPi 
(McFarland, 2012). Six months later, on  November 14, 2012, the  USD(AT&L) formally 
introduced the seven new initiatives. The second iteration of BBPi (BBPi 2.0) includes 
seven thrust areas with 36 initiatives that build upon and place emphasis on initiatives 
within the initial BBPi memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a).   The thrust areas are: 1) 
Achieve affordable programs; 2) Control costs throughout the product life cycle; 3) 
Incentivize productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government; 4) Eliminate 
unproductive processes and bureaucracy; 5) Promote effective competition; 6) Improve 
tradecraft in acquisition of services and 7) Improve the professionalism of the total 
acquisition workforce (OUSD[AT&L], 2012). BBPi 2.0, Figure 6, is currently out for 
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comment to government and industry until January 2013 (OUSD[AT&L], 2012). At that 
point, the BBPi is revised incorporating comments from government and industry. 
 
Figure 6. Better Buying Power 2.0.  (After OUSD[AT&L], 2012) 
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On September 20, 2012, USD(AT&L) Mr. Kendall commented that the BBPi of 
managing costs and establishing affordability caps have produced real results, while 
others have been unproductive (as cited in Serbu, 2012, p. 1). Mr. Kendall also admitted 
that there was an “overreaction” to some of the initiatives initially, and many contracting 
officers look for the approved solution in the released memoranda (as cited in Serbu, 
2012, p. 2). For example, Mr. Kendall cites the practice of using fixed-price contracts 
versus cost-plus contracts where appropriate. He also echoed sentiments of establishing 
metrics—particularly enforcing affordability targets in BBPi 2.0 (OUSD[AT&L], 2012).  
The preceding section summarized acquisition reforms starting with the Packard 
Commission and ended with the BBPi. The following section identifies academic 
research pertinent to this research.   
C. ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
Snider (1996) explored the price of professionalizing the acquisition workforce. 
DAWIA, which requires particular course requirements to achieve a level of certification 
in one’s career field, has, in large part, created an insular and careerist acquisition 
workforce (p. 8). Instead of coming up through the ranks, learning about each important 
aspect of the acquisition process, practitioners become very specialized. Snider (1996) 
argued that instead of learning about what role each area of defense acquisition plays and 
the respective career fields, what has been created is a mindset of “ticket punching” for 
certifications. As a result, the notion of professionalism is associated with achieving the 
commensurate level of certification. Achieving a certification does not make someone a 
professional within that field; however, years of experience, working in many different 
areas with successful outcomes, do. Rendon (2010) argues that as the landscape of 
acquisition changes, so should the knowledge, education and qualification requirements 
of the acquisition workforce. This falls in line with the premise of Snider and argues for 
holding the acquisition workforce accountable for their work product. 
Cooper (2002) researched the DoD’s effectiveness in implementing acquisition 
reform through workforce training. The research examined several acquisition reform 
initiatives proposed since 1990 and the DoD’s primary sources of acquisition workforce 
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training. Cooper (2002) conducted a survey to evaluate the effectiveness of training 
sources as perceived by acquisition workforce members. The data gathered from the 
sample of 411 responses indicated survey respondents were only “somewhat” satisfied 
with the training received in support of acquisition reform. Cooper (2002) recommended 
that acquisition reform training be decentralized and that the DoD provide on-site reform 
advocates while increasing web-based DAU instruction (Cooper, 2002, p. i). Today, 
many major commands have on-site ombudsmen and competition advocates, as well as 
staff dedicated to training contract and acquisition personnel on the latest requirements. 
The SMC, home of the SBIRS program office, is in receipt of such training through the 
SMC University and the SMC/PK Directorate of Contracting.   
Chenoweth, Hunter, Keltner, and Adamson (2003) assessed barriers to 
implementing acquisition reform. The study examined the incorporation of Contract 
Repair Enhancement Program (CREP) tenets in repair contracts at Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center (WRALC). The study identified successful methods to incorporate 
various organizational levers, policies, and practices senior leadership can use to 
influence individual behavior to achieve policy objectives. The team found that 
organizational levers can help explain contract measures of success. Training in fostering 
positive attitudes toward acquisition reform, as well as effective teaming, had a consistent 
statistical relationship with contract innovation (Chenoweth et al., 2003, p. i). 
Cooper (2002) and Chenoweth et al. (2003) identified reasons why reform has not 
always been as successful as originally intended. The general theme that came from both 
of these studies is at a cultural level—the culture of the acquisition community and the 
ability to effectively do one’s job. Much of the narrative concerning the community is the 
negative accounts; however, the majority of the acquisition community is dedicated, 
intelligent, and extremely resourceful. Contracts and programs do not run autonomously. 
Many view the next reform as a “performance act,” a passing phase, of Congress and 
senior leadership, and treat it as such (Jackson, 2011). These reforms are simply a 
restatement of the duties of program managers and contracting professionals. The “must 
dos” outlined are being completed; however, outcomes—even arguably successful 
outcomes—look quite different to each stakeholder. Frankly, a software engineer 
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working on a program may not care that the payload software development special study 
has to be determined as being fair and reasonably priced, but it makes all the difference to 
a contracting officer. 
Layden (2012) published a telling paper on the Army program managers’ 
perspective of the BBPi. One hundred respondents, consisting of O-6 equivalent civilians 
and their deputies, participated in a survey regarding the BBPi published guidance and its 
implementation (Layden, 2012, p. 5, 39). Data were collected summarizing the views of 
the program managers within the following areas:  familiarity with individual initiatives; 
perceived impact of initiatives on their programs; the value of additional BBP guidance, 
training, and tools; and, perspective on the cost-savings potential of each of the initiatives 
(p. 58). Layden concluded program managers are familiar with the initiatives at a basic 
level, but additional guidance would not bring about significant changes in the way 
business is conducted. Lastly, the group believed that not many of the BBPi have the 
potential to result in significant cost savings for the amount of resources required for 
successful implementation (p. 64). 
D. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Using an open-systems approach, Snider and Rendon (2008) elaborate on 
procurement policy by expanding other public procurement models (e.g. Harland, Gibbs, 
& Sutton, 2000; McCue & Gianakis, 2001; Thai, 2001) to provide explicit depiction of 
the units of analyses through structural and allocative elements (p. 294). Figure 7 
highlights the five elements to the Snider and Rendon (2008) public procurement policy 
framework. The first element is structural policy. Structural policies include laws, statutes 
and regulations. The second element is allocative policy; allocative policies include the 
tangible goods that provide a benefit (i.e., contracts) as a result of implementing the 
structural policies. The third element is output; outputs are at the lowest level and are 
applied in allocative policies. The fourth element is outcome; outcomes, the next highest 
order, ensure integrity in the process. The last element is impact, the highest order 
element. Impact  ensures integrity, accountability, and transparency in the acquisition 
process. Past experience shows that many allocative policies may follow the structural 
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policies to the letter of the law, but the impact of those policies may appear to be unfair 
or misguided.   
 
Figure 7. Framework for Analyzing Public Procurement Policy (from Snider & 
Rendon, 2008, p. 295) 
Snider and Rendon (2008) highlight the complexity of the public procurement 
policy with the development of this framework. As all of these inputs flow into the 
framework, it will take a significant period of time to collect data and identify whether 
BBPi policy will have a considerable effect on defense procurement programs. At the 
outset, DoD officials wanted to set up metrics that would provide feedback on how the 
BBPi was working six months after implementation. However, the ability to develop 
metrics without tangible data is impossible and the DoD will not be able to quantify the 
impact of the BBPi for a significant time after the BBPi have been fully implemented. 
E. ACQUISITION REFORM AND KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEORY 
Creating a knowledge flow of information and using that knowledge to execute 
new tasks is an important step in understanding where linkages in execution and training 
are not continuous. This is where the current research is relevant and worthwhile. Using 
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the BBPi and the training support that the DAU has provided, along with assessing the 
implementation and execution in the day-to-day work environment, this research will 
highlight any gaps or missing linkages that may be helpful in training the future 
acquisition workforce.    
Knowledge through action and subsequent performance secures a competitive 
advantage (M. E. Nissen, personal communication, October 9, 2012). This is the concept 
of knowledge flow theory. Acquisition professionals are constantly bombarded with 
information and data. Without the ability to synthesize and group that information/data 
into a meaningful context degrades our ability to increase the overall performance of the 
acquisition workforce. Acquisition processes, besides creating a competent and capable 
acquisition workforce, are the key to successful acquisition outcomes, which in turn 
support the warfighter and our competitive advantage on the battlefield. 
In order to secure a competitive advantage, groups must perform at high levels 
taking information from all pertinent resources and taking steps to synthesize that 
information and data into useable knowledge (M. E. Nissen, personal communication, 
October 9, 2012). Figure 8, illustrates the knowledge flow process in a multidimensional 




Figure 8. Multidimensional Knowledge Flow Visualization model (from Nissen, 
2006) 
As members of the acquisition workforce progress through the ranks and achieve 
the appropriate certifications requisite for their jobs and positions, the explicit knowledge 
acquired is then organized into useable chunks of information. This stage is known as 
socialization. Once they are able to organize that information and draw upon it to 
formulate their unique experiences, it becomes tacit knowledge, an invaluable asset to use 
in any applicable situation going forward. This stage is known as externalization, drawing 
from information synthesized as part of one’s knowledge base. The stages of 
socialization and externalization are the continual process of learning. The flow time as 
shown in Figure 8 for both these stages is long. This means that it takes a significant 
amount of time (which will vary by individual) to get the next stage of understanding. As 
information is acquired, that information becomes part of one’s knowledge base to be 
used and implemented in the context of future experiences. When transferring tacit 
knowledge from an individual to a group (work office, OSD to the workforce), this 
process is known as combination. While difficult to accomplish, the flow of knowledge 
from externalization from combination moves quickly (short flow time); however, up to 
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this point, knowledge flows slowly as it takes time to develop experience that can be 
drawn on for the greater good of the group. Internalization occurs over time throughout 
an organization. 
To introduce the organizations that are the subject of the research, two case 
studies below outline pertinent information about the SBIRS program and Defense 
Acquisition University. 
F. SBIRS CASE STUDY 
1. Program Office 
The Infrared Space Systems Directorate is located at the Space and Missile 
Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB in El Segundo, CA. Part of the Directorate is the 
SBIRS program, which is responsible for the multi-billion dollar SBIRS development 
activities. The Directorate is home to more than 650 government, military, aerospace, and 
contractor personnel. The $26.9 billion portfolio of space and ground systems includes 
SBIRS and DSP (SMC, 2012). The mission of the Infrared Space Systems Directorate is 
“to develop, acquire, and sustain space based infrared surveillance, tracking and targeting 
capabilities for missile early warning/defense, battlespace awareness and technical 
intelligence” (SMC, 2012).  
2. Space Group 
The SBIRS Space Group is responsible for the development, acquisition, 
integration, launch, and early orbit operations of the SBIRS GEO satellites and Highly 
Elliptical Orbit (HEO) sensors and operational sustainment of the DSP satellite 
constellation. The Group consists of more than 100 government personnel and a 
contractor team of over 1,400 personnel, spread throughout the 13 work location across 
the United States (SMC, 2012). These systems are critical for protection against global 
and theater ballistic missile attacks against the U.S., its deployed forces, and its allies 
(SMC, 2012).  
The SBIRS Operating Location (OL) was established in the summer of 2006 and 
is located at the Lockheed Martin facility in Sunnyvale, CA. The OL is the focal point for 
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the Space Group’s Space Vehicle Division. The Space Vehicle Division manages 
integration, test, delivery, and launch of the first two GEO satellites. 
3. Origins of the Program 
The Air Force acquired the SBIRS to replace the Defense Support Program and 
related systems, including consolidation of DSP ground processing within the CONUS 
(SMC, 2012). Although it draws on previous efforts to develop a follow-on to the DSP 
(i.e., Follow-on Early Warning System [FEWS]; Alert, Locate, and Report Missiles 
[ALARM]), the SBIRS acquisition is not a direct continuation of these programs. The 
scope of the envisioned effort is considerably broader than the previous DSP (increase in 
costs). SBIRS High is an integrated system consisting of multiple space and ground 
elements, with incremental deployment phasing, simultaneously satisfying requirements 
in the following mission areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, 
and battlespace awareness. 
The SBIRS High program is intended to satisfy key requirements delineated in the 
SBIRS Operational Requirements document dated August 15, 1996, with Annex 1 dated 
July 17, 1998 (DoD, 2011). The constellation architecture for SBIRS High includes HEO 
sensors and GEO satellites, along with several ground elements: a continental United 
States-based Mission Control Station and Mission Control Station Backup, overseas 
Relay Ground Stations, Mobile Ground Stations, and associated communication links. 
The first increment of the SBIRS ground system supports mission processing of the 
legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) system satellites, SBIRS’ predecessor (DoD, 
2011). 
4. Cost Considerations 
The program has experienced four Nunn-McCurdy breaches since 1996 (OSD, 
2005a). The USD(AT&L) signed the SBIRS High acquisition program baseline (APB) on 
January 26, 2012 (DoD, 2011). The revised APB incorporates the latest reconciled cost 
estimates and establishes new schedule milestones for delivery of the GEO satellites and 
associated ground segment upgrades necessary to ultimately satisfy the SBIRS 
requirements. The program office is “aggressively pursuing cost efficiencies in all current 
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and planned contracts, consistent with Air Force and Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) initiatives to ensure better buying 
power and implement should cost management” (DoD, 2011). Figure 9 identifies the 
costs associated with the 2013 President’s Budget for the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) for GEO satellites 1 through 6, HEO payloads 1 and 2 and future predicted 
ground modifications (DoD, 2011). 
 
Figure 9. SBIRS Cost Summary (from DoD, 2011) 
5. Schedule Considerations 
a. GEO 1 Space Vehicle  
Nine years after the established date, GEO 1 Space Vehicle (SV) 
successfully launched aboard an Atlas V, with a Centaur upper stage, on May 7, 2011. 
The satellite deployments were successful and the team first received data on June 21, 
2011. Early on-orbit system tests were completed on July 14, 2011. GEO 1 is 
transitioning to its operational location and is on track to complete its trial period and 
enter into operations in January 2013 (DoD, 2011).  
b. GEO 2 SV 
GEO 2 successfully completed baseline integration and deployment 
testing. Lockheed Martin delivered the GEO 2 space vehicle in June 2012. The current 
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launch manifest assigned GEO 2 a primary launch date in May 2013. Consequently, the 
program office is working with the development contractor to develop a storage plan and 
to assess associated costs and impacts (DoD, 2011) 
c. GEO 3 & 4 
Hardware production and affordability have been issues for the satellite 
(DoD, 2011). To combat problems in the future, the program office has begun integration 
and testing procedures on GEO 3 and GEO 4. While maintaining its schedule, the SBIRS 
program is aggressively pursuing cost efficiencies in all current and planned contracts, 
consistent with USD(AT&L) initiatives and completing should-cost analyses (SMC, 
2012). 
d. GEO 5 & 6 
As of June 2012, GEO 5 and 6 were in negotiations for non-recurring 
engineering and parts procurement. As a key strategy, the USD(AT&L) directed the GEO 
5 and 6 effort be established as a major subprogram to the SBIRS High program under 
Section 2430a of Title 10 of the United States Code (DoD, 2011). Subsequent selected 
acquisition reports (SAR) will address the GEO 5 & 6 effort as a subprogram to SBIRS 
High. As of December 2012, GEO 5 & 6 are currently on contract to begin work. 
6. SBIRS Capabilities 
Sensors on the SBIRS satellite provide greater flexibility and sensitivity than its 
predecessor, DSP (Ramer, 2011, p. 23).   SBIRS enhances mission capability with short 
and mid-range infrared signals increasing the range of systems SBIRS can support (p. 
26).   The SBIRS High system which includes GEO and HEO satellites have a scanning 
and staring sensor. Both sensors improve the capabilities for sensitivity in detection of 
threats, the ability to revisit previously identified targets increases the sensitivity of the 
satellites making the system flexibility for many uses (p.26). The GEO scanning sensor 
provides a shorter revisit time than DSP over its full field of view, while the staring 
sensor will be used for step-stare or dedicated stare operations over smaller areas (USAF, 
2010). SBIRS GEO and HEO sensors process data that is transmitted to ground units 
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projecting the situation observed in space (SMC, 2012). The first SBIRS HEO payload 
was delivered in August 2004 for integration, and the second HEO payload was delivered 
in September 2005 (DoD, 2011). In November 2006, the Air Force announced the 
successful on-orbit check-out of the first HEO-1 satellite.  
7. Key Performance Parameters 
The specifications of the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) are 
classified; however, the KPP areas approved by the Air Force Requirements Oversight 
Council (AFROC) are listed below:  
• KPP 1—Defense of the United States. The ability of the system 
design to meet threshold operational effectiveness requirements—
negation and performance probabilities—given a specific attack 
size and sophistication of associated countermeasures.  
• KPP 2—Human-in-Control (HIC). The ability of the system for 
positive control of the system by human operators for system 
functions such as battle redirection, weapon release, and 
engagement termination.  
• KPP 3—Automated BMC3. The ability to provide automated 
battle management capability.  
• KPP 4—Interoperability. The ability of the system to be 
interoperable and compatible with external systems such as 
Integrated Tactical Warning & Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) and 
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The 
operational benefit of interoperability will be enhanced flexibility, 
enabling the addition of new users or new missions and optimized 
information flow.  
8. SBIRS Source Selection 
The Infrared Systems Directorate accomplished the objectives identified in an 
architecture study completed during the system development and demonstration (SDD) 
phases to implement the functions of earlier systems. Contractors were asked to provide 
feedback to complete a study during the SDD phase to develop capability (TSPR) and 
enhance requirements. Solicitations for the contracted effort were issued as Full and 
Open competition for the SDD &EMD phases with Cost-Plus Award/Fixed Fee 
(CPAF/CPFF) contracts.  
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The SDD phase will consist of system architecture level trades of performance, 
cost, and requirements and development of candidate solutions. The tasks included are as 
follows:  
• developing options for transition to SBIRS High from the existing DSP,  
• identifying risk areas and conducting appropriate risk mitigation activities, 
and  
• assessing the performance and integration planning associated with the 
potential introduction of a LEO component in the SBIRS architecture in 
the next decade.  
 
The EMD phase consisted of two parts:  
• Phase One: Space and ground system and architecture-level trades of 
performance, cost, and requirements, and development of candidate 
solutions, after which a down-selection will take place (Commerce 
Business Daily, 1995). 
• Phase Two: A single contractor team will mature, finalize, and integrate a 
selected design; validate manufacturing and production processes; produce 
elements of the architecture; and integrate, test, and evaluate the SBIR 
system (Commerce Business Daily, 1995).  
Contractors were evaluated using the following evaluation criteria for technical 
and past performance metrics (Commerce Business Daily, 1995):  
• systems architecture, engineering, and cost projection for complex space 
systems;  
• design, development, analysis, and integration of space vehicles and 
associated ground systems meeting defined and derived requirements;  
• subsystem and system integrated test and evaluation of space systems;  
• critical surveillance technologies including their development and 
integration for future space systems;  
• space system production capability; 
• design and development of fixed and mobile ground systems for satellites; 
and  
• launch vehicle operations including spacecraft/launch vehicle integration 
and test.  
Contractor teams participating in the effort were Lockheed Martin/Loral/Aerojet 
and Hughes/TRW. Two CPFF contracts were awarded to Lockheed/Loral/Aerojet and 
Hughes/TRW in 1995 for the pre-SDD phase valued at $159M (SMC, 1999). The 
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Lockheed Martin team was selected for EMD and was awarded a contract for $2.1B6 
(SMC, 1999). Lockheed won subsequent follow-on contracts for development and is 
currently in a sole-source arrangement for the production of future satellites.  
9. Lessons Learned & Best Practices 
At the 2005 Congressional Authorization conference, the Secretary of Defense 
was mandated to provide Congress a classified and unclassified report explaining most 
recent cost increases, schedule delays, and technical problems. Congress was concerned 
with the SBIRS Directorate because of a Nunn–McCurdy breach and recertification in 
FY 2002. Additional breaches occurred again in 2005, 2007, and 2009. SBIRS was re-
baselined and continued to have problems, triggering the congressional report (OSD, 
2005a). The report identified two main problems with the program and how they were 
addressed. 
The first problem was contractor integration issues. The Directorate believed the 
contractor was not properly staffing the program with quality personnel (OSD, 2005a, 
p. 24). The SBIRS was a high-priority program and the contractor should have had its 
highest quality employees working on it. Given that this program was a pilot for the 
program management technique of total system performance responsibility (TSPR), this 
is of no surprise. Lockheed fixed the concern by realigning personnel to improve the 
quality of staff. The contractor also hired additional resources from throughout to the 
entire corporation to identify key personnel.  
The second problem concerned cost growth from FY 2002 to 2004, which was not 
planned for and occurred shortly after the program restructure in FY 2002 (OSD, 2005a, 
p. 24). To address the issue, the Directorate identified three root causes traced to cost 
growth. The root causes identified were as follows: 1) latent defects caused insufficient 
product assurance in earlier design and production activities; 2) the schedule and budget 
were insufficient to ensure robust GEO first article integration and testing; 3) there were 
process escapes deriving from human error, insufficient training, and fragile processes 
(OSD, 2005a, p. 25). The Directorate took steps to address the technological problems 
resulting from the latent defects, moving to an event-driven approach. This approach 
 49 
requires definitive entrance and exit criteria for each key milestone. If the criteria are not 
met to enter an event, the event is postponed until the technology is mature. There also 
has to be a high probability of success to obtain approval from the milestone decision 
authority (MDA) to enter the next milestone. If the government had employed sound 
program management principles instead of TSPR, perhaps many if not all of these 
failures could have been avoided. 
G. DAU CASE STUDY 
Prior to the passage of DAWIA, there were 12 different regulations addressing the 
training of acquisition personnel (Layton, 2007, p. 131). As part of DAWIA in 1990, the 
creation of a professional acquisition workforce with specifying standards for training 
proved to be challenging. Since the 1950s the establishment of professional career paths 
in procurement and acquisition were a concern of Congress (Layton, 2007, p. 4). 
1. Origins of DAU 
DSMC (Defense Systems Management College), DAU’s predecessor, originated 
with four course curriculums in contracting, program management, quality assurance and 
business and financial management (Layton, 2007, p. 6). In December 1985, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV recognized the need to make improvements to 
workforce training and career development. Taft established the Acquisition Career 
Management (ACE) program office at DSMC (Layton, 2007, p. 9). The program office 
drafted a progress report on the state of the acquisition workforce (Hirsch, 1986). Up 
until that point, training was decentralized, fragmented, and often of poor quality 
(Layton, 2007, p. vi). As a result of the ACE report, DSMC became responsible for all 
training provided to the acquisition workforce, not just program managers (Layton, 2007, 
p. 9). Congress provided DSMC with the authority for all acquisition workforce training, 
which included legislation for the establishment of a university and general guidance 
about its structure and mission (Layton, 2007, p. 13). The standards for training were 
issued in DoD Directive 5000.52 and DoD Manual 5000.52-M, Career Development 
Program for Acquisition Personnel (DoD, 1991a).   
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2. Establishing DAU 
Donald Yockey, principal deputy undersecretary for acquisition, formed a board 
to create the DAU implementation plan as required by Congress. The six elements the 
board established were 1) a charter, 2) a mission, 3) lines of authority, 4) a framework for 
education, 5) a policy guidance council, and 6) a mechanism for resource allocation 
control (NDAA, 1991). In establishing a charter for the university, DoD Directive 
5000.57 (DoD, 1991b) gave broad instruction on the functional structure and the 
responsibilities of DoD leadership to the university. The university was centrally 
managed, and DSMC now fell under its purview. From October 1991 to August 1992, 
Yockey and the implementation board made broad decisions for the future of the 
university. In August of 1992, the DAU opened its doors (Layton, 2007, p. 21). The 
mission of DAU is to provide practitioner training, career management and services to 
enable the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics communities to make smart business 
decisions and deliver timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter (DAU, 2008).   
3. Establishing an Educational Framework 
The key to meeting the training needs of every DoD organization was to establish 
good internal and external relationships with its stakeholders. These relationships had 
been loosely defined by DoD 5000.57 (DoD, 1991b), but responsiveness and support 
were essential to providing courses to the acquisition workforce. Within the university 
(internally), a consortium of training programs managed by the ACE program office was 
formed to share the roles and responsibilities of delivering training. As an advantage of 
this consortium, the DoD was able to leverage the workload with the ability to be flexible 
to changing training requirements (Layton, 2007, p. 27). Under memoranda of agreement, 
the consortium included 12 components of the military departments and provided 24 
mandatory courses in procurement and program management (Layton, 2007, p. 28).   
The year following the DAU’s opening, the university achieved small victories. 
Twenty-four thousand students graduated from 60 mandatory courses (Layton, 2007, p. 
41). But the curricula offered to students was not original, but another offering of the 
same courses provided by consortium members (Layton, 2007, p. 41). DoD directives 
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gave standards for certification and the material topics that are required to earn the 
certification, and the DAU is responsible for ensuring that the material is taught in a way 
that ensures educational effectiveness. The DAU is responsible for education processes 
and outcomes (Hawkins & Granzo, 1997). In June 1992, the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) directed curriculum developers to establish competency- 
based training (Layton, 2007, p. 41). Competency-based training requires students to 
develop knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that apply the learned material in real-
world scenarios. 
 Using a competency-based training model, the DAU established curriculum 
certification levels, including courses at various skill levels, ranging from those that 
established fundamental knowledge to those that represented the pinnacle of achievement 
(Layton, 2007, p. 42). Today, the DAU enlists a competency/criterion-based learning 
concept (DAU, 2010, p. 10). The competency/criterion-based learning concept defines 
relevance with respect to the knowledge/content base of any given field (DAU, 2010). 
The DAU developed its courses using the framework of Bloom’s taxonomy (Layton, 
2007, p. 42). In addition to the use of Bloom’s taxonomy, shown in Figure 10, the DAU 
also follows a four-step course design process of analysis, design, develop, and evaluate 
(Layton, 2007, p. 43). Using this process, the university has adopted a more interactive 
learning environment using exercises, case studies, and simulations. Hands-on learning is 
the mantra of the DAU. Bloom’s taxonomy is named after Benjamin Bloom, an 
educational psychologist who studied the classification of educational objectives and the 
theory of mastery learning (Bloom, 1985). Bloom’s taxonomy is a classification of 
learning objectives divided into three domains: cognitive, affective, and psychomotor. 
Learning at a higher level is dependent on having the prerequisite KSAs at lower levels 
(Orlich, 2004). Bloom’s model, paired with DAWIA curricula certification levels, is 
outlined in Figure 10.  
President Obama announced his intention to achieve improvements in the 
acquisition system. As part of those improvements, a greater emphasis is placed on 
having a high quality workforce with the right competencies and skill sets (DoD, 1991b). 
In October 2010, the GAO evaluated DoD’s training program provided by DAU. The 
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GAO found that the DAU “demonstrates the capability to provide effective training, 
though some attributes of an effective training program are lacking” (GAO, 2010). In FY 
2009, DAU records show that 90 percent of the acquisition workforce completed training 
commiserate with their grade and position, but DoD does not maintain metrics on the 
skill sets of the acquisition workforce or employ methods to assess increased workplace 
efficiency through the training provided.   
 
Figure 10. Bloom’s Taxonomy and DAU Course Progression (from Layton, 
2007, p. 42) 
H. SUMMARY 
The Packard Commission set the tone for the acquisition reform initiatives that 
have followed behind it. Of note, almost all of the initiatives have highlighted some form 
of what the Packard Commission recommended. The goal has always been and continues 
to be to achieve the best value in terms of schedule, performance, and cost. By default, if 
acquisition reform continues to be a hot topic, perhaps the lessons learned were not 
effectively engrained into the DoD and the acquisition workforce the first time; hence, 
there is a need for continued reform. The research on acquisition reform is plentiful; 
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however, studies do not do a good job after initial implementation to quantify the costs 
and effectiveness of the imposed reform. At the end of this chapter, I provide case study 
analyses of both organizations, setting the stage for the environments in which they 
currently operate. The goal of Chapter II was to cover the major acquisition reform 
initiatives from the Packard Commission through today’s BBPi, provide relevant 
academic research on acquisition reform, along with providing pertinent information on 








Emphases on acquisition reform shift with each change of leadership. This 
research focuses specifically on the BBPi. The manner in which the Services execute the 
BBPi is not governed by USD(AT&L), defining a common measure of success is 
necessary to ensure successful implementation. In this chapter, I describe the 
methodology used to develop a singular metric to measure the implementation of the 
BBPi by the Services. The evolution of the BBPi is synergistic. I utilize the case-study 
method to review acquisition reform and current program issues. I also discuss the 
research design, how programs were selected for this research study, and the method of 
investigation used when visiting these organizations. Discussions in this chapter also 
include procedures for data collection and recording, organizations researched, and 
limitations to the research methodology. 
B. INITIAL RESEARCH 
Initial research for this topic began with a review of previous research conducted 
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT). This analysis included prior research on acquisition reforms since Packard’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission, published documentation and correspondence to the acquisition 
workforce through 2012. After reviewing the available information, two areas were 
identified for further study: 
• The status of the BBPi integrated into current MDAPs, and 
• The training provided to the acquisition workforce, including new 
concepts as identified within the BBPi 
C. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY 
The case-study methodology is the best way to study the SBIRS program, DAU 
and the USD(AT&L)’s BBPi. As Yin (2009) described, the case-study methodology 
deals with the situation when there are more variables of interest than data, when multiple 
sources of evidence are needed to make a complete picture, and when the study benefits 
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from the development of theories beforehand to guide data collection and 
analysis (p. 18).   
This research study was designed as an exploratory case study that addresses 
current program events with respect to the BBPi analyzed through qualitative methods 
(Yin, 2009). The USD(AT&L) provided directives to all components and activities as to 
what actions to implement on their respective programs. As a result of the issuance of the 
initial memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a), subsequent memorandums were issued 
with additional guidance. Each program is at a different phase on the acquisition cycle, 
and because of that, has unique opportunities to implement the BBPi. Of the several 
memorandums issued, the memorandum from November 3, 2010 (OUSD[AT&L], 
2010b) is an implementation directive for the MILDEPS and all Service agencies. The 
data collected in my study are responses from interviewee respondents. These data are 
then analyzed against the Snider & Rendon (2008) analytical framework and using the 
Nissen (2006) multidimensional knowledge flow visualization model.   
D. SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS 
Requests for organizational approval were sent to the leadership of the 
organizations identified in Chapter I. The organizations were asked to identify points of 
contact. Once approval was received, the command identified points of contact that were 
emailed to set up interview times that best matched their daily work schedules. 
Respondents included in this study were limited to subject matter experts in the research 
areas: program managers and contracting officers.  
E. INSTRUMENTATION 
Research subjects were interviewed using predetermined research questions in the 
form of a questionnaire. These questions were open-ended to enable a robust discussion 
of topics. The questionnaire was not distributed prior to the interview, but subjects were 
provided with a general overview of topics to be discussed, along with the basis for the 
research. Data were collected during interviews in both group format and one-on-one 
interviews.   
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As part of the NPS Institutional Review Board, measures were taken to protect 
interview respondents. Once the data were collected and transcribed or copied, the 
original data, either electronic or hard copy, were destroyed. Consent was obtained to 
identify interview respondents by name in the report. However, no respondents were 
directly cited within the report. Interview questions are listed in Appendix B and Chapter 
IV—Findings and Analysis. Based on the current status of the SBIRS program, questions 
aligned with the five thrust areas to program specifics.   
Research questions for the SBIRS program office were derived from the 
November 3, 2010, Implementation Directive of the BBPi (OUSD[AT&L], 2010b). 
Within that document the OUSD(AT&L) highlights specific actions for agencies to take 
within the five thrust areas. The questions focused on familiarity of the guidance, 
technology maturity, system design, cost growth, and contract structure. Towards the end 
of the interview, broad questions were asked of the group to provide their individual 
perspective on the BBPi. The interview questions for DAU were designed based on the 
September 14, 2010, memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). 
F. ORGANIZATIONS RESEARCHED 
Two sites were visited to collect data for this project. The SBIRS program office 
at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA, and the DAU at Fort Belvoir, VA, were the locations 
of the areas of study.  
As documented by leaders in the DoD and Congress, the SBIRS has been 
highlighted as an example of what not to do when managing a major acquisition program. 
Because it is such an extreme case, the case-study method focuses on its nuisances while 
highlighting the effect of the BBPi on current and future efforts concerning leveraging 
the DoD’s buying power. DAU, responsible for the professional training certification of 
the acquisition workforce, plays a key role in providing training for the workforce. As 
part of the analysis, DAU provided feedback on how the initial training was deployed to 




Chapter III explains the research methodology. Although simple, and 
straightforward, it allows an honest assessment of the BBPi solely on their merits. 
Assessing one of the most troubled acquisition programs in the Air Force, perhaps the 
DoD, and the organization responsible for the training of the acquisition workforce 
provides insight on how acquiring knowledge, developing positive acquisition outcomes 
while using that knowledge and translating that into a competitive advantage to organize, 
train and equip or military forces is the focus of the next chapter. Chapter IV assesses 
implementation efforts from an execution standpoint through the Air Force’s SBIRS 
program and also from a training perspective through the DAU. The chapter provides an 
analysis of the implementation efforts through the lens of knowledge flow theory 




IV. FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
So now that all of the latest and greatest acquisition reforms since the 1980s have 
been explored, how do the latest BBPi fit into the mix and how has the DoD implemented 
them into its on-going acquisitions?  The BBPi are not a plug-and-play solution, but 
enable the DoD to use tools created in a strategic way to create effective acquisition 
outcomes from a financial and end user perspective. Many of the BBPi fall within the 
realm of the program manager; however, contracting has a key stake in determining and 
bringing those successful acquisition outcomes to fruition. It is in the best interest of the 
acquisition workforce, particularly the contracting workforce, to facilitate the use of the 
BBPi. Within this chapter, the implementation efforts of the BBPi by the SBIRS program 
at SMC and the training efforts by DAU are discussed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the DoD’s implementation of the BBPi 
using the information obtained in interviews conducted at DAU and SBIRS. At the 
conclusion of this chapter, the following research questions are answered:  
• Question #1: How has the DoD responded to implementing the BBPi—
execution within Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) from the 
perspective of the SBIRS program, focusing particularly on the November 
3, 2010, memorandum?  
• Question #2: How has the DAU responded to the training needs of the 
acquisition workforce with respect to the BBPi?  
The research utilizes the Nissen (2006) model of Multidimensional Knowledge Flow 
Visualization, along with the Snider and Rendon (2008) framework for analyzing public 
procurement policy to analyze the research findings. 
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B. RESPONDENTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1. SBIRS Program Office 
The group from the SBIRS program office included five individuals working in 
the functional areas of program management, contracting and business/financial 
management. These individuals are currently working on the production of GEO 3 & 4 
and the acquisition of GEO 5 & 6. The personnel interviewed were senior level military 
members in the grade O-5, one company-grade officer in the grade of O-3 (with prior 
enlisted contracting experience), and two mid-grade civilians, GS-13. Their years of 
experience ranged from 5 to 17 years in their respective fields. The interviews were 
conducted in both one-on-one and group formats. Table 6 summarizes the SBIRS 
respondent group by functional area. The “Other” respondent functional area is part of 
the business/financial management workforce. 
2. DAU 
The group from the Defense Acquisition University included five respondents. 
The group included the current center directors for acquisition management and 
contracting, DAU liaisons to the Business Senior Integration Group (B-SIG), deputy 
director of the Learning Capabilities and Integration Center (LCIC) and deputy director 
for the OUSD(AT&L) Human Capital Initiatives. Those working in a capacity for DAU 
served in a civil service position or on active duty prior to assuming their post at the 
University. Many are retired officers with multiple years of experience in operational and 
systems contracting environments. Interviews were conducted in a one-on-one format. 








Table 6.   Respondent Demographics 
Functional Area SBIRS Program Office DAU 
Contracting  3 2 
Program Management 1 4 
Other  1 0 
 
C. RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following are responses to interview questions posed to the SBIRS program 
office and the DAU. The answers to the questions are summary paraphrases of the 
interview transcripts.   
The interview questions for the SBIRS program office are created from the 
USD(AT&L)’s November 3, 2010 BBPi memorandum (OUSD(AT&L), 2010b). The 
memorandum was an implementation directive to the Services based on the five thrust 
areas and 23 initiatives of the September 14, 2010 memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 
2010a). The interview topics focused on the BBPi to include technology maturity, system 
design, affordability, and contract structure. 
The interview questions for the DAU are created from the USD(AT&L)’s 
September 14, 2010 memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). The memorandum provided 
Carter’s initial guidance to the workforce mandating to deliver better value as well as the 
accompanying initiatives. The interview topics focused on the BBPi—namely how the 
course curricula had been modified to include the BBPi.   
1. SBIRS Program Office 
Question 1:  Are you familiar with the BBP guidance from the USD(AT&L)? 
SBIRS program personnel were familiar with the BBPi memoranda put out by the 
USD(AT&L), but were not immediately familiar with the rapid deployment training 
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(RDT) provided by DAU. The program manager in the group highlighted that he felt 
there was ambiguity in the guidance put forth and that it had been the subject of 
discussion and often misinterpreted.   
Question 2:  Would you say that these areas have been a focus of your program 
more, less or the same since the issuance of the BBP initiatives? 
The focus of [SBIRS] is to ensure mission assurance in a timely manner and on 
cost. BBPi has not generated new initiatives simply because of its implementation, but it 
has generated a dialogue about possible alternatives that may increase the productivity 
and output of a program. The SBIRS program office has engaged in separate focused 
training sessions that drill down into the concepts of fixed-price incentive contracts and 
how they are administered. DAU also provided mission assistance training to SMC 
during a three day course.   The SMC Directorate of Contracting through their 
contracting unit assigned to each of the program offices has also taken measures across 
the Center to implement the BBPi through ESP. The Center has reduced the use of H 
clauses and more specifically SBIRS has implemented a Program Operating Plan (POP) 
with Lockheed Martin that governs how meetings are conducted decreasing some of the 
overhead work, details procedures for administrative issues and gives escalation 
procedures should an issue be unable to be reached at lower levels. A program 
management official stated that the POP limits the amount of meetings that we are having 
or supposed to have that generates—kind of turns into a savings and cost as well. Based 
on the reduction of the use of H clauses, a contracting official identified that SMC as a 
whole predicts a projected $120M cost reduction from minimizing their use. None of 
these savings have been realized, but they are example of some the measures taken to 
realize affordability.   
Question 3: Would you say that the critical technologies and system designs are 
mature? 
A program management official explained that the satellite design is mature. For 
the ground system, the software is not yet in place to fully exploit the data. GEO 1 has 
been launched and GEO 2 has been tested and is in storage awaiting launch. GEO 3 & 4 
 63 
are currently in production and GEO 5 & 6 are in negotiations to be placed on contract. 
There is a requirement for dual band GPS and a secondary payload; however, the 
requirement is unfunded. However, the option to add this capability is included in the 
contract. Technically GEO 5 & 6 is a mature design, but the ability to add this 
contingency if necessary is available.   
Question 4:  As background, from October 1996 to July 2011, the total program 
costs increased from $919M to approximately $3B. Are contract incentives in 
place to curtail cost growth in the future? 
GEO 3 & 4 is a cost plus award fee contract and is being examined to incorporate 
more of BBPi focusing on controlling costs. As part of the contract, the incentive has 
multiple parts: a base fee, a program execution performance portion that assesses cost, 
schedule and performance as well as mission success incentives (MSI). The MSIs are a 
delivery incentive. If [Lockheed Martin] delivers on time and meet certain criteria, then 
they receive an incentive. 
GEO 5 & 6, is predominantly a fixed price incentive fee contract. The design is 
mature and the program office only addresses obsolescence to deal with risk as a cost 
incentive. That cost incentive, as they execute to the contract and delivery, represents a 
50% split between the satellites. Lockheed Martin is given an opportunity to earn an on-
orbit incentive. The incentive is to meet scheduled costs and then balance it to make sure 
a mission capable satellite is built. In addition, SBIRS holds a percentage of the contract 
cost to ensure immediate launch success and then five years down the line to ensure 
mission capability. If either of these two provisions is not met, Lockheed would have to 
incrementally pay back the Government if they don’t meet the criteria of the on orbit 
incentive.   
Question 5:  Are there any value engineering clauses in the contract?  Have they `
 been used? 
There are value engineering clauses in each of the contracts; however, when 
addressing their use, to suggest that Lockheed Martin submit value engineering proposals 
was something that was out of the question. Unsure of why, the program office would not 
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ask for these types of proposals is because the negative experience SBIRS had when 
using TSPR as a program management approach. The program manager offered a unique 
perspective:  it was stated that advocating for value engineering proposals introduces risk 
(cost & schedule) into a mature design. While they welcomed good ideas, the program 
office did not want to “shoot themselves in the foot.” 
Question 6:  Did issues with parts obsolescence play into the strategy for the 
contract type selected? 
Parts obsolescence was a critical issue as there was a four year lag in the 
production of GEO 3 & 4 and GEO 5 & 6. To remedy this issue, the program office 
asked that Lockheed provide an obsolescence report through 2016. By knowing that issue 
is on the horizon, the risk (schedule) can be mitigated. Risk from a technical standpoint is 
minimized as the design is mature, and the risk stems from new supplier contracts. To 
mitigate the risk, the program office projects a 10 to 12 month lead time between the first 
contract action and when production would commence. Availability of parts is critical 
when you are only producing two satellites at any one time. 
Question 7:  How was the mandate of affordability integrated into the baseline 
and mission areas?   
On GEO 5 & 6, the acquisition strategy was socialized and approved a under 
stable and mature design with unit costs realized on GEO 3 & 4. The program 
management official stated the largest hurdle in getting affordability integrated into the 
baseline was getting buy-in from Lockheed Martin. If what they proposed on GEO 3 & 4 
(cost-plus incentive) is an accurate target, there should be no issue with the affordability 
of GEO 5 & 6. As production moves along on GEO 3 & 4, the program office has more 
insight into what the numbers look like on GEO 5 & 6. 
Question 8:  Do you think it is important to target cost growth as a priority?  
In order to target cost growth as a priority, the program office has had to make 
tradeoffs. For example, GEO 5 & 6 is a fixed-price contract arrangement; whereas GEO 3 
& 4 and the contract effort for EMD are cost type arrangements. A contracting official 
explained that [Lockheed Martin] is incentivized to control costs much more under a 
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CPAF contract arrangement than a Fixed-price Incentive Fee (FPIF) contract 
arrangement. A contracting official explained that there should be no surprise when 
important areas such as technical capability and schedule fall by the wayside when a 
heavy emphasis is placed on targeting cost growth as a priority. 
2. DAU 
Question 1: What are some of the measures that DAU has taken to provide 
guidance as a result of the initiatives? 
DAU assessed the environment from a strategic and a tactical perspective and is 
taking a phased implementation approach to the BBPi.   From a strategic point of view, 
the B-SIG met and continues to meet regularly to ensure the efforts met those of all 
involved. A program management official explained that the B-SIG is chaired by Mr. 
Kendall and all of the service acquisition executives and the component acquisition 
executives from the different DoD agencies under the USD(AT&L)’s purview were 
represented.  
At the tactical level, a three phase approach was taken. The first phase was to 
complete the RDT for the workforce. RDT is a type of training that we create and execute 
for major policy revisions within DoD or the federal government. As explained by the 
program management official who developed the RDT, its target audience was O6s and 
GS-15s in acquisition centers of concentration.   The second phase was to provide in 
depth training on demand at an acquisition organization via mission assistance modules. 
DAU sends personnel to provide training tailored to the needs of an organization. The 
third phase is implementing and infusing the first and second phase into the curricular 
material. DAU has revised the training with respect to the first round of the BBPi and 
BBPi 2.0.   
Question #2: At the acquisition research symposium, sponsored by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in June 2012, Ms. McFarland spoke about certification vs. 
qualification—the tacit (experience) knowledge to do your job versus the explicit 
(book) knowledge. Is DAU concerned about this issue? 
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DAU is concerned with the certification achieved after the requisite course 
completion and the applicable time requirement and the knowledge gain when 
completing the tasks expected of those within the workforce. For this reason, DAU has 
set up the Workforce Management Group. A program management official explained that 
the Workforce Management Group assesses issues associated with implementing a 
certification to qualification (C to Q) framework within a largely civilian workforce. 
With active duty military, mandates for qualification standards are the standard; however, 
requirements like those for the civilian workforce can get problematic and cumbersome 
quickly. Conditions of employment, creating organizational ownership in the process 
(qualification/expertise for those identified as qualification “validators”) failing to qualify 
or willfully refusing to obtain the requisite qualification are just some of the issues when 
creating a qualification requirement for a largely civilian workforce. From an active duty 
perspective, many have achieved their certification by meeting the time requirement in a 
billet coded for a particular career field. They have or may not have necessary acquisition 
expertise. As explained by a program management official, an acquisition workforce 
member obtaining their DAWIA Level III program management certification requires 
only one of the required four years of experience be in a program office. An individual 
might have gained the required time requirement, but may not have gained specific 
experience aligned to the competencies expected of them.   
OSD approved an OJT tool for use by the contracting workforce. On the floor or 
experiential on the job training is the method to learn the details an occupation. The tool 
builds on the explicit knowledge gained in online and in-resident DAU courses and 
allows new personnel to work with seasoned professionals to transfer corporate 
knowledge. Explained by a contracting official, as part of the 2010 Capable Contracting 
Workforce (CCW) subcommittee action items, the DAU was charged with developing a 
new, more robust OJT tool for the contracting workforce. DAU fulfilled the CCW’s 
action item by modeling the OJT tool after military training reports and records. The tool 
covers 28 contracting technical competencies and 10 professional quantities. In 2011, the 
CCW charged the DAU with refining the implementation approach to the OJT tool for 
the contracting workforce. In a December 2011 DPAP memorandum, components were 
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advised to use the OJT tool at their discretion (DPAP, 2011). As part of a viable and 
capable acquisition workforce, the ability to demonstrate contracting tasks and functions 
properly is important. The first time many people are asked to demonstrate the tasks 
learned, they are in a real-time environment. 
Program Management is also leaning forward with the Program Management 
Acquisition Qualification Standards (PM AQS) modeled after Navy Qualification 
Standards. A program management official explained that PM AQS is a pilot program to 
assist the workforce member track to see if they are gaining the right experiences for their 
career path and to work with their supervisor. While the pilot program is still in process, 
DAU hopes to make a decision on implementation with data from the initial findings. 
Question #3:  Many people are thrown into situations that they are not ready to 
manage with only a certification stating they have completed the applicable 
curriculum courses necessary to maintain that certification. Is DAU looking at 
ways to measure explicit knowledge prior to providing course completion 
records? 
A program management official identified the end state for a competent 
workforce is that everyone who touches acquisition in a meaningful way is qualified in 
the skill sets required to achieve successful acquisition results.   The qualification 
framework is given by career field specific requirements and organizational functional 
progression. Using training and application methods (simulation or OJT), assessments 
would be developed to determine proficiency. Workforce qualification would be 
competency based with a well-documented performance reference model, to include OJT 
with identified learning assets, measured proficiency confirmed through demonstrated 
competencies (McFarland, 2011). As part of BBPi 2.0, a single qualification framework 
has yet to be developed, but would mimic the example in Figure 11. 
In addition to tools being created, congressional legislation was drafted for 
inclusion in the 2011 NDAA for career-path requirements. A contracting official 
explained that this legislation (NDAA, 2011) established requirements for OJT and 
demonstration of qualifications in the critical acquisition-related duties and tasks of the 
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career path, in addition to academic programs, self-development activities, and 
development of key work experiences. In addition to the development of career-path 
requirements, Congress has also limited the number of months spent in an academic 
training program towards fulfilling the new legislative requirement. Personnel can earn 
no more than 12 months toward the qualification requirements. In addition to establishing 
qualification requirements, Congress has given the OUSD(AT&L) guidance to establish 
periodic renewal of an individual’s certification once every five years (NDAA, 2011, 
§874).  
 
Figure 11. Qualification Framework (from McFarland, 2011, p. 13) 
Question #4. Are there any barriers to successful outcomes—providing training at 
the level you think you should be able to? 
Both program management and contracting officials identified culture as the 
largest barrier to change and implementing the BBPi. From their perspective, the 
checklist mentality has gotten in the way of progress for the future. During our dialogue, 
examples were given about how the individual installations were interpreting and 
implementing the BBPi. Although the Services are directed to implement the BBPi at 
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some level, not every action is appropriate for all situations. A program management 
official provided a prime example of using the BBPi as a checklist item. One installation 
visited for a mission assistance call held 30-day competitions for purchase card buys to 
ensure competition. In fact, this is an incorrect implementation of BBPi as it flies in the 
face of the use and efficiency of the government purchase card as well as the 
consideration of micro-purchases. This story highlights the issue that units are not using 
the BBPi where it is not advantageous, but using the initiatives as checklist item or 
blanket policies.  
Question #5:  Lots of rhetoric that says more policy won’t fix acquisition, but a 
well-trained quality workforce will. What is DAU doing to improve the training, 
tacit versus implicit knowledge of the workforce? 
A contracting official identified that investment in the workforce (proper training 
and experience) is of utmost importance. There is a fine line between the outcomes of 
developing processes or developing competent personnel. Without streamlined processes, 
the workforce lacks an effective model to complete their jobs. Without a competent 
acquisition workforce, the mission stops. Somewhere in between is the right answer, not 
one or the other. As a professional career field, enlisting honest people and holding them 
accountable for their actions is how acquisition is remedied. 
Question #6:  Feedback from the workforce on OJT modules:  any feedback or 
changes made since initial deployment? 
Having taken this opportunity to update the course curriculum to include BBPi, 
the entire contracting course curriculum (DAWIA Level I through III) was revamped 
simultaneously. As explained by a contracting official, feedback from the contracting 
career field was hard-hitting because as people were completing courses, the 
requirements for certification were changing as they were completing their curriculum.   
Although this burden is self-imposed, the workforce must be flexible to meet ever-
changing needs. A program management official responsible for the RDT for the 
workforce experienced feedback stating that the information was too much too soon. 
Even though the RDT was focusing towards a different target audience, those who would 
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be working with the BBPi intimately, needed to be familiar with the material, more so 
than senior leadership.   
Question #7:  From a certification perspective, what specific changes were made 
to training courses (Level I through III for contracting and program 
management) and what was the rationale behind it? 
The DAU course curriculum for contracting was completed revamped as a result 
of the introduction of the BBPi. In many cases, the BBPi are implemented into course 
curriculum through case studies and active discussion within the courses. A contracting 
official explained that individual changes are tracked by course and are highlighted by 
instructors within their teaching notes. A matrix of the DAU course offerings is included 
in Appendix A, showing all of the courses implementing the BBPi into their training 
plans. 
D. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
1. SBIRS Program Office 
The November 3, 2012 memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010b) gave specific 
actions to execute immediately or in the timeframes outlined in the September 14, 2010 
memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). Three of the five thrust areas are applicable to 
SBIRS—target affordability and control cost growth, incentivize productivity and 
innovation in industry, and reducing non-productive processes and bureaucracy. SBIRS 
has been successful in executing the intent of the initiatives as written. The program early 
on was plagued with management and performance issues. The use of TSPR and the need 
to get a system in place quickly caused a ripple effect. On the front end of development, 
programs can subtract and delete capability to get to pre-determined affordability targets. 
The problem occurs when proper planning did not occur or was not completed to the 
level of scrutiny required. In fact, at the outset of the program, affordability was not on 
the radar of decision makers. DoD as a whole wanted the capability of SBIRS quickly, so 
they received it quickly—plagued with cost overruns and capability delivered 
significantly behind schedule.  
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The sentiments echoed by the Layton (2012) study also rang true during the 
interview of the SBIRS program office. At some point, it is not efficient, nor does it make 
good business sense, to undo progress based on new acquisition reform if its outcome is 
unknown or results in a marginal increase in dollars saved or performance improvements. 
The SBIRS program office is making headway in delivering the long awaited capability. 
GEO 1 launched in 2011, GEO 2 is awaiting launch, GEO 3 & 4 are moving towards 
production and GEO 5 & 6 are on contract to begin work. While they have incorporated 
the thrust area of incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry going forward, 
(using stable designs, negotiating SBIRS GEO satellites as block buys with FPIF contract 
structures, reducing the use of H-clauses), there is little they can do to fix the errors of the 
past that still plague the program. Although it is too soon to tell if the affordability targets 
established will be met, the measures taken are a step in the right direction. 
2. DAU 
The research shows that DAU is revising course material to contain a dialogue 
about the BBPi with respect to each of their courses it affects. While DAU’s policy is to 
provide competency/criterion-based training, they have met that requirement. However, 
the extent of the effectiveness of that dialogue (case studies, exercises, class discussion, 
and evaluation of current MDAP programs) using the current training model is unknown.    
DAU has two subjects that require their expertise:  formal requirements for qualification 
under DAWIA and re-certification as outlined in Section 873 of the NDAA of FY 2011. 
Implementing standards for qualification and re-certification is a good idea, but the DAU 
and DoD must be careful going forward in determining what is included in the guidelines 
for qualification and re-certification. 
E. ANALYSIS USING KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEORY  
As discussed in Chapter II, knowledge flow theory can be applied to the OSD 
working with the DoD to implement the BBPi. The tacit and explicit knowledge bases 
have been gained within the organizations separately; however, the socialization of those 
experiences and recognition of the importance they hold take time to filter throughout the 
whole of the DoD. Many of the BBPi are solely the responsibilities of the program 
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manager; however, Layden (2012) states that program managers do not need any more 
management tools, but they need the resources (funding, qualified people) to execute 
programs to ensure successful outcomes. Should cost analysis and affordability 
determinations can be created all day, but if the knowledge gained from those analyses 
does not have an impact on outcomes within an organization, they will continue to fail to 
meet the affordability targets. This is an instance of instituting policy without practice. 
The DAU’s efforts to move from a certification to a qualification framework are 
favorable. However, the MILDEPs as well as the DAU have a lot of work to complete 
concerning implementation. The issues that must be addressed are funding for course 
instruction, improving the DAU’s capacity to increase student enrollment, decentralizing 
certification within the MILDEPS or delegating it to individual units. Under the 
qualification framework, members of the acquisition community are solely responsible 
for their success or failure in learning the profession. 
During my interview with SBIRS, I learned that SMC provided their own training 
and tailored it to their specific needs. Space acquisition has challenges. There is no reset 
button to bring a satellite back after launch. In addition, it takes longer on average for a 
system to go through the complete life cycle framework (Brandwein, 1996). Some argue 
that there may be better space programs to evaluate for this study—SBIRS is fifteen years 
in the making and is just now getting its footing. Despite that fact, the ability to achieve 
efficient and effective acquisition outcomes in any program, no matter its current state is 
a goal to continually strive to achieve. Figure 8 highlights the multidimensional 
knowledge flow visualization model. SMC is currently between the stages of 
externalization and combination on the knowledge flow visualization model. 
Externalization occurs more on an individual level whereas combination of knowledge 
occurs at every level, from the individual, to the group and eventually the organization. 
Within the life cycle of knowledge (as depicted in Figure 8), the process of combining 
information spans from its creation to its formalization and sharing within a group. DoD 
and the Services, while having initially implemented the spirit and intent of the BBPi, are 
still working to identify what the true effects of imposing these initiatives on their 
respective MDAPs and what the impact will be on future outcomes. When asked, two out 
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of the three respondents in the group interview were unaware that DAU had developed 
training modules for the BBPi initiatives but they had received local training on the effort 
through SMC.  
F. ANALYSIS OF THE BBPI & SNIDER & RENDON FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Chapter II outlines the five elements of the Snider and Rendon (2008) framework. 
The structural policy of this acquisition reform initiative is the BBPi. Structural policies 
include laws, statutes and regulations. The allocative policies include the tangible goods 
that provide a benefit (e.g., contracts). In this case, the allocative policies would be 
contracts awarded with the BBPi throughout. The output of a contract let with the BBPi, 
results in decreased cost growth, efficiencies in technology and capability delivered to the 
warfighter. The outcome of that contract let with the BBPi competition is afforded at 
each milestone decision point; industry is incentivized to be more efficient and innovative 
with their solutions while facilitating an open dialogue between government and industry. 
The impact is integrity in the acquisition process, accountability within industry and the 
DoD and transparency in the process.   
In an ideal environment, this is why the BBPi works. Instead of the ideal 
environment described above, reality is much different. Within the acquisition 
environment, stakeholders have differing agendas on the decision making process and 
subsequent implementation of ideas, negatively impacting the outputs and outcomes. 
Instead of the positive outcomes previously identified, as a result of BBPi 
implementation, competition can be restricted forcing industry to be limited on the 
solutions they can provide to the government. Another negative outcome of BBPi is the 
potential negative impact on the industrial base. Both of these examples diminish the 
integrity, accountability and transparency of the acquisition process. Contracts written 
with the intent and spirit of the BBPi  can follow its mandates very closely, but what the 
future impact that BBPi has on acquisition outcomes has yet to be realized. An example 
of the misinterpretation of the BBPi was highlighted during one the DAU interviews. A 
program management official was providing mission assistance training to a unit was 
shortly after the BBPi was released. While discussing the thrust area of Improving 
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Tradecraft in Service Acquisition, it was revealed that  the unit was conducting 30-day 
solicitation periods on government purchase card buys because the BBPi memorandum 
provided guidance concerning one bid proposals. 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
My recommendations for the BBPi, based on the September 14 and November 3, 
2010, memoranda (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a) are as follows: 
1. Recommendations for Programs 
First, programs should internally define metrics for the BBPi by thrust areas 
identified in the September 14, 2010, memorandum (OUSD[AT&L], 2010a). The 
memorandum states that military capability must increase 2–3% annually. Is this in terms 
of contract dollars saved or spent? Is this 2–3% for each military department?  This is an 
example of the more nuanced language needed as part of the BBPi to give the workforce 
something to work from. In addition, success will look somewhat different depending on 
the desired outcome. Without guidance from OSD as to what defines success, MDAPs 
should define their own metrics in line with the capabilities and desires of their Services. 
Being proactive in this situation ensures that the owners of the requirement are driving 
the objectives and not someone else. 
Second, the BBPi, current and 2.0 should be refined to include inputs from the 
acquisition community. If MDAPs are held to these performance standards, their inputs 
should be heard early and often. BBPi and BBPi 2.0 have lofty goals that OSD and the 
SAEs fully intend to execute. While some of the initiatives may seem germane, their 
potential impact is far reaching.   Not all of the first 23 initiatives have had as much of a 
stirring impact as the DoD hoped. BBPi 2.0 provides more language to fill in the gaps 
from the first round of BBPi initiatives (for example: contract length, methods of 
evaluation [LPTA vs. trade-off], and reducing profits) (Moore, 2012).   In addition to 
contracting and program management, BBPi 2.0 also affects the acquisition workforce 
and the potential for qualification requirements for acquisition coded billets. 
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2. Recommendations for DAU 
DAU must persuade DPAP to make use of the OJT tool mandatory for the 
training programs of all new acquisition workforce personnel. The development of the 
OJT tool, while making its use optional by the MILDEPs undermines progress before it 
starts. This is another example of policy without practice. A consortium of experts from 
each of the MILDEPS should be formed to define the scope and impact of the OJT tool in 
acquisition workforce training programs. Repeatable, actionable processes along with a 
qualified workforce are the key components to DoD acquisition righting itself. 
Establishing a baseline of knowledge, to which everyone is held accountable, is a good 
start to that goal. 
DAU should create formal requirements for qualification under DAWIA, as well 
as re-certification requirements as outlined in Section 873 of the NDAA of FY 2011. 
Although easy to recommend, these two issues will take much time and forethought to 
implement in a proper and meaningful way. DAU along with OSD are working in concert 
to make both a reality. Many outside acquisition see the function as an administrative and 
support role. If DoD is intent on changing the perception of the acquisition workforce 
outside of itself, it must be addressed immediately. The landscape of our current MDAPs 
is high risk. We need competent and capable acquisition workforce professionals leading 
the charge to achieve the lofty rewards associated with those risks. BBPi 2.0 seeks to 
remedy this by codifying a qualification framework. 
H. CONCLUSION 
DoD should review acquisition reform initiatives three to five years after 
implementation, before formulating additional measures. The impact of any one decision 
is not immediate due to the second- and third-order effects. By implementing the above 
course of action, the DoD would gain experience and eliminate duplication of reform 
efforts, many of which are implemented, but never superseded or overwritten by new 
mandates.  
At the highest levels, policy-makers understand and see the urgency to implement 
these initiatives swiftly. At the working level, implementation is taking longer than 
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expected. The acquisition workforce is not sure what the expectation is concerning BBPi. 
Determining the importance and the effect that the initiatives have, let alone the impact of 
full implementation and vetting has left more questions than answers. 
I. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to assess the DoD’s implementation of the BBPi 
at the DAU and the SBIRS program office. The DoD has implemented the intent of the 
BBPi as well as possible given the guidance and the expectation set by the USD(AT&L). 
In addition, the DAU has provided many assets, such as RDT, to meet the needs of the 
acquisition workforce; however, without implementing a qualification standard to obtain 
the necessary credentials under DAWIA, the DAU is not able to ensure successful 
educational outcomes. Although the definition of educational outcomes was never 
explicitly addressed, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn that the acquisition workforce 
that enrolls in courses and completes the required material has a baseline of competency 
and has achieved the commensurate certification. In Chapter V, I recap Chapters I 




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the previous chapters, provide 
conclusions and recommendations based on the research conducted. To summarize the 
research, one of the tenets of Jim Collins’ (2001) book Good to Great provides an 
overarching theme concerning this project: get the right people on the bus, the wrong 
ones off. The right personnel and processes are the key to alleviating concerns about 
procurement and acquisition.  
B. SUMMARY 
The intent of this study is to provide a benchmark for other Services and programs 
so they can use knowledge management in determining and transferring that information 
into better acquisition outcomes. In Chapter I, I highlight the current state of fiscal stress 
in the United States. When resources are constrained, leadership must make the tough 
decisions about priorities without diminishing the ability to organize, train, and equip our 
military forces. In Chapter II, I provide a review of acquisition reform from the Packard 
Commission of 1986 to today’s BBPi. In Chapter III, I outline the methodology used in 
this research. As the BBPi continue to evolve, I use the case-study approach to study the 
SBIRS program office and the DAU. The chapter reviews the approach used to address 
acquisition reform and current program issues, data collection and recording, the research 
design and the method of investigation used when visiting the organizations researched. 
In Chapter IV, I provide an assessment of the DoD’s implementation of the BBPi using 
the information obtained in interviews conducted at the DAU and the SBIRS program 
office. At the conclusion of the chapter, I answer the research question within the 
framework of knowledge flow theory, Nissen’s (2006) Multidimensional Knowledge 
Flow Visualization model and Snider and Rendon’s (2008) framework for analyzing 
public procurement policy.   
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter IV answered the research questions. The conclusions are specific to the 
two case studies identified within this research. Based on the interview responses and the 
analysis, I have arrived at the following conclusions: 
• Question #1: How has the DoD responded to implementing the BBPi—
execution within Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) from the 
perspective of the SBIRS program, focusing particularly on the November 
3, 2010, memorandum?  
The research conducted is a small subsection of all of the efforts taken by 
program offices to implement the BBPi. For the purposes of this paper, I looked at one 
organization as a representative sample for what is occurring across DoD acquisition 
programs. The research found that BBPi is a good first step; however, there are 
prerequisites that must be met in order for BBPi to be successful. Those prerequisites are: 
1) processes must be streamlined across the Services; and 2) there must be a standard 
level of competency within career fields that define the acquisition workforce.   
As far as implementing the BBPi with respect to the 3 November 2010 
Implementation directive (OUSD[AT&L], 2010b), new programs are having success 
because these principles were addressed during acquisition planning. The proper 
forethought was given to how to structure programs to prevent errors of the past. SBIRS 
is in a unique position because they are able to capitalize on many of the BBPi within its 
program due to ESP. Because ESP governs space acquisition concerning BBPi, they have 
been able to build in affordability by purchasing satellites in block buys. While these 
contracts are negotiated in a fixed price environment, the savings identified are merely 
theoretical. However, with stable and mature system designs, the projected savings can 
be achieved.   
It is hard for programs that have a long, arduous period in the development cycle 
to fully benefit from any elements of the BBPi. The time spent in development is a trade-
off between delivering capability to the warfighter and implementing requirements that 
are over and above what is necessary to carry out the mission. In this case, the SBIRS 
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program is the poster child of problematic programs. BBPi can and should be 
implemented where it makes sense, since it does not make sense to disrupt established 
schedules and baselines for a marginal benefit in schedule or performance.   
• Question #2: How has the DAU responded to the training needs of the 
acquisition workforce with respect to the BBPi?  
DAU has met the initial intent of the USD(AT&L) with respect to providing 
training to the senior level acquisition workforce. Those that execute the initiatives 
created at a lower level are in need of training assistance. The RDT modules were 
focused at senior leadership and not those who complete the work day in and day out. 
DAU is attempting to remedy that misstep with BBPi 2.0, but caution should be taken 
with respect to generating more policy. The initial premise of BBPi was to get “back to 
basics” and that should be streamlining processes across the services and focusing on 
quality training and experience for the acquisition workforce. As highlighted in the GAO 
(2010) report, the effectiveness of the BBPi course curricula update is unknown because 
DAU does not track metrics to assess the results in enhancing capability through their 
training efforts.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
I provide three recommendations for future research: 
The first recommendation is for future researchers to replicate this study within 
their Services with their respective MDAPs. By replicating this study, additional research 
creates a body of knowledge for this current acquisition reform initiative and may 
provide insight on how to proceed with future reform initiatives.  
The second recommendation is to create a body of knowledge documenting the 
progression of implementation with Better Buying Power. This body of knowledge 
provides a living history of the BBPi as intended and as they were implemented across 
DoD to avoid similar negative outcomes in the future or to replicate effective and 
efficient acquisition outcomes in the future. 
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The third recommendation is to evaluate the Services’ business processes with 
respect to the education and training of the acquisition workforce. The only way to 
implement DAWIA qualification is to revamp the current processes so that military and 





A. DAU BBPI COURSE UPDATES 
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B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. SBIRS Interview Questions 
Question 1:  Are you familiar with the BBP guidance from the USD(AT&L)? 
Question 2:  Would you say that these areas have been a focus of your program more, 
less or the same since the issuance of the BBP initiatives? 
 
Question 3: Would you say that the critical technologies and system designs are mature? 
 
Question 4:  As background, from October 1996 to July 2011, the total program costs 
increased from $919M to approximately $3B. Are contract incentives in place to curtail 
cost growth in the future? 
Question 5:  Are there any value engineering clauses in the contract?  Have they been 
used? 
 
Question 6:  Did issues with parts obsolescence play into the strategy for the contract 
type selected? 
 
Question 7:  How was the mandate of affordability integrated into the baseline and 
mission areas?   
 
Question 8:  Do you think it is important to target cost growth as a priority?  
 
2. DAU Interview Questions 
Question 1: What are some of the measures that DAU has taken to provide guidance as a 
result of the initiatives? 
 
Question #2: At the acquisition research symposium, sponsored by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in June 2012, Ms. McFarland spoke about certification vs. 
qualification—the tacit (experience) knowledge to do your job versus the explicit (book) 
knowledge. Is DAU concerned about this issue? 
 
Question #3:  Many people are thrown into situations that they are not ready to manage 
with only a certification stating they have completed the applicable curriculum courses 
necessary to maintain that certification. Is DAU looking at ways to measure explicit 
knowledge prior to providing course completion records? 
Question #4  Are there any barriers to successful outcomes—providing training at the 
level you think you should be able to? 
Question #5:  Lots of rhetoric that says more policy won’t fix acquisition, but a well-
trained quality workforce will. What is DAU doing to improve the training, tacit versus 
implicit knowledge of the workforce? 
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Question #6:  Feedback from the workforce on OJT modules:  any feedback or changes 
made since initial deployment? 
 
Question #7:  From a certification perspective, what specific changes were made to 
training courses (Level I through III for both contracting and program management) and 
what was the rationale behind it? 
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